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1. Introduction 
 By integrating the boundary between firms, companies can focus on core skills 
and competencies while acquiring the capabilities they lack (Chan et al., 1997; Tavriverdi 
and Venkatraman, 2004).  Firm integration is not dichotomous in nature, but instead 
exists among a set of strategic choices.  These choices range from remaining independent 
firms and transacting with one another at “arms-length” to integrating via a 
merger/acquisition (Williamson, 1975, 1991; Hennart, 1993; Villalonga and McGahan, 
2005).  Alternative choices of integration include the formation of a partnership, such as a 
strategic alliance or joint venture.  These forms of integration allow for a closer boundary 
between firms, while keeping the original firms intact.  
 As an example of the options available to firms, consider Microsoft, which has a 
long history of boundary formation changes to enhance the development of its software.  
In 2006, Microsoft and EMC Inc. officially announced a new strategic alliance that was 
forged to “commit to broader and deeper product inter-operability and service 
delivery…through the powerful combination of Microsoft’s data center solutions and 
productivity applications and EMC’s information infrastructure solutions…”1  In 2000, 
Microsoft and Accenture Inc. (then Anderson Consulting) announced the creation of a 
new joint venture called Avanade
2
 designed to develop business software based on a 
Windows platform that would be available for distribution through Accenture’s business 
channels.   
 Theoretical work on the choice of boundary integration has often focused on the 
ownership of physical assets through transaction costs, such as the classic “hold-up” 
                                                 
1
 From Microsoft Inc.’s February, 2009 press release. 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2009/feb09/02-03EMCRenewPR.mspx 
2
 As of 2010, Avanade had U.S. $1bil in annual revenue. 
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problem (Williamson, 1975; Klein et al, 1978; Acemoglu et al., 2009).  The role of 
knowledge assets in determining the boundary is less clear.  Williamson (1975) and Klein 
et al (1978) suggest that the framework for the hold-up problem may not be applicable to 
knowledge assets.  Physical assets are owned by the firm and therefore increasing the 
integration between firms also increases the shared control of those assets.  Knowledge 
assets, on the other hand, are inevitably linked to human capital (Subramanian, 2008).  
Because humans cannot be owned by a firm, increasing integration may not result in an 
increase in shared control of knowledge assets.  However, according to Jensen and 
Meckling (1992), the role of knowledge assets may be important when “value relevant 
knowledge is unevenly distributed through an economy as knowledge may become costly 
to transfer among agents.” Integration acts as a mechanism to reduce this cost by 
allowing knowledge to flow more freely within the boundary of the firm.  The question 
then becomes, how do firms decide to form their boundaries with other firms when 
economically relevant knowledge can not freely flow between them? 
 To address this question, this paper primarily focuses on deals relating to 
partnerships (strategic alliances and joint ventures), though I do dedicate a later portion of 
my analysis to mergers/acquisitions.  There are a multitude of reasons to analyze strategic 
alliances and joint ventures in the setting of boundary integration.  For one, partnerships 
allow for the traceability of knowledge flow even after a deal has been completed.  
Unlike mergers/acquisitions, where there is only one surviving firm after deal completion, 
all original firms still exist following a partnership deal.  Therefore, knowledge assets in a 
partnership can be traced to an originating firm source even after deal completion.  
Second, I focus on partnerships due to the inherent differences in deal structure between 
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partnerships and mergers/acquisitions.  For strategic alliances and joint ventures, all 
entities remain in control of their existing knowledge assets following the deal.  The level 
of ownership of these assets does not change, just the level of access granted to the 
partnering firm.  In comparison, a merger/acquisition represents a transfer of ownership 
of knowledge assets from the target firm to the acquirer.  Subramanian (2008) indicates 
that transfer of ownership during an acquisition does not necessarily increase the level of 
access to a knowledge asset.  Therefore, by focusing on partnerships, I can analyze the 
integration choice based on access to knowledge assets without the possible confounding 
effects that could be brought on by a change in ownership. 
 The purpose of this paper is fourfold.  First, while empirical literature has 
identified integration as a mechanism to reduce the hold-up problem between firms 
(Shenoy, 2012; Acemoglu, 2009), the role of knowledge flow on the level of integration 
chosen has not been examined carefully.  In this paper, I strive to capture the integration 
choice more completely by examining whether or not knowledge flow affects the 
decision to form a more integrative boundary.  Additionally I recognize that the choice of 
integration exists along a set of strategic alternatives.  I therefore examine whether the 
level of knowledge flow between firms affects the level of integration chosen. 
 To do this, I use a collection of 3,119 deals from the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) Strategic Alliance and Joint Venture database and 1,349 mergers/acquisitions 
from SDC’s Mergers & Acquisitions database between 1986 and 2005 as the setting for 
my tests.  This data is then combined with patent and patent citation information from the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (henceforth USPTO) from 1976 to 2005 to 
create two proxies to measure the level of knowledge flow between firms.  The first 
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proxy measures the frequency of patent self-citations within firms.   Similar to the 
workings of Wang et al. (2009), I argue that firms with a higher percentage of self-
citation have more firm-specific knowledge that cannot be easily transferred to other 
firms
3
.  Additionally, following Seru (2010), I create a proxy to measure the average 
number of years until a firm’s patent is able to be cited externally.  All else being equal, 
patents that are difficult to access will take a longer time to understand and use in future 
patents and therefore the time it takes for knowledge to flow between firms will increase.   
 Consistent with the argument that knowledge flow is a key determinant of the 
level of integration between firms, I find that firms with a higher percentage of patent 
self-citation are more likely to form a partnership.  A one standard deviation increase in 
percentage of self-citations raises the likelihood of a firm forming either a strategic 
alliance or joint venture by 5.2%.  These results hold when using the average years to 
first patent citation as an alternative proxy to measure the restrictions to knowledge flow 
between firms.  When a firm does choose to form a partnership, I find that firms with a 
higher percentage of patent self-citations select the more integrative joint venture 
boundary compared to a less integrative strategic alliance.  A one standard deviation 
increase in percentage self-citations raises the likelihood of forming a joint venture over a 
strategic alliance by 7.4%.  Furthermore, to avoid potential identification problems, I 
divide strategic alliances into sub-categories to test the impact of patent self-citations on 
the choice of strategic alliance type.  I find that even within the strategic alliance 
definition, firms are more likely to select a more integrative form of a strategic alliance 
when the percentage of self-citations is higher.  While my prior evidence suggests that 
                                                 
3
 Wang et al (2009) and Bena and Li (2012) use a similar measurement to calculate the degree of difficulty 
to replicate knowledge assets. 
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firms with a higher percentage of patent self-citations are more likely to form more 
integrative partnerships, it does so by looking at the choice of each firm individually.  
Since the partnership decision is not made by a single firm, but instead multiple firms 
jointly, I test the relation between the firm boundary choice and knowledge flow at the 
firm-pair level as well.  My results find that firm-pairs with a higher combined average of 
percentage patent self-citations are more likely to form a more integrative boundary, 
consistent with the findings at the firm-level.   
 The second purpose of this paper is to address the question of whether the level of 
integration plays a pivotal role in the flow of knowledge between firms.  Gomes-Casseres 
et al (2006) indicates that firms forming alliances are more likely to have an increase in 
patent cross-citations after the announcement date of the deal.  Sevilar and Tian (2012), 
Anjos and Fracassi (2012), and Bena and Li (2012) look at mergers/acquisitions and find 
mixed results as to the level of increase in patent output following the deal completion.  
This paper analyzes whether or not the level of integration affects the degree of change in 
knowledge flow.  If firms are forming more integrative boundaries to gain access to each 
other’s knowledge assets, then the level of integration should positively affect the amount 
of knowledge able to flow between firms.  I find that as the level of integration chosen by 
firm-pairs increase, so too does the level of patent cross-citations in subsequent years 
following the deal announcement date.  Firms choosing a strategic alliance or joint 
venture see a 6.5% increase in the percentage of cross-citations compared to firms who 
remain independent and firms choosing a joint-venture see an 11.5% increase in cross-
citation usage compared to firms forming a strategic alliance. 
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 The third purpose of this paper is to analyze role of knowledge flow when 
ownership, and potentially access, is increased as is the case with the target selection in a 
merger/acquisition.  Similar to Bena and Li (2012), I find that acquiring firms tend to 
target smaller companies with higher R&D intensity.  However, I find only weak 
evidence that suggests that these firms are targeted due to the restriction of knowledge 
flow between the target and the acquirer.  This evidence suggests that acquiring firms 
may primarily care about ownership of the target’s assets rather than increasing access to 
these assets.  I do find, however, that all else being equal, the likelihood of being a 
targeted firm versus an acquiring firm does increase as the percentage of patent self-
citations increases. 
 Lastly, I analyze the market reaction to partnership and merger/acquisition deals 
to search for a possible link between the percentage of patent self-citations and 
announcement date effects.  If forming more integrative firm boundaries allows 
companies to form synergies by gaining access to other firms’ knowledge assets and 
increasing the knowledge flow between firms, then a deal announcement should result in 
positive abnormal returns for the firm.  For partnerships, I find firms have higher 
abnormal returns when their partnering company has a greater percentage of patent self-
citations indicating these firms are gaining increased access to these knowledge assets 
and improving knowledge flow to the firm.  I find no evidence that this holds for 
mergers/acquisitions. 
 Overall, my findings indicate that the level of knowledge flow does play a crucial 
role in the determination of the firm boundary.  The boundary choice of firms is both a 
frequent and non-trivial corporate decision.  From 1986 and 2005, there were over 50,000 
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strategic alliances, 30,000 joint ventures, and 50,000 mergers/acquisitions in the United 
States alone
4
, each representing a firm boundary choice.  This paper aims to illustrate the 
importance and impact of knowledge flow in the boundary decision. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 gives a brief 
literature review and develops the research questions.  Section 3 describes the use of 
patent data and describes their value as a tool to measure knowledge flow.  Section 4 
explains the data and variable construction.  Section 5 describes the empirical 
methodology used.  Sections 6 and 7 present and discuss the results while Section 8 
concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Research Question Development 
 There is a growing body of literature that recognizes the importance of outside 
transactions costs in determining a firm’s level of boundary integration.  Several 
theoretical works have been devoted to the understanding of firm boundaries beginning 
with the seminal work by Coase (1937).  In his paper, he theorized that a firm would 
form boundaries around costs deemed less costly internally rather than those found in 
outside markets.  Subsequent theoretical literature was devoted to defining transaction 
costs that would cause firms to form more integrative boundaries including, agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986), costs born from asymmetric information 
(Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993), diversification costs (Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Murphy, 
1990; Berger and Ofek, 1996) and organizational structure costs (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1975 and 1985). 
                                                 
4
 From data provided by the Securities Data Corporation Strategic Alliance and Joint Venture database as 
well as the Securities Data Corporation Mergers and Acquisitions database. 
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 Transaction cost theory stipulates that a firm chooses to acquire assets when the 
ongoing costs of conducting business in the market are higher than the organizing costs 
within the firm (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Klein et al, 1978).  One such cost 
identified by Williamson (1975) results from the classic hold-up problem among 
economically related firms.  When firms rely on assets held by another firm, the holder of 
those assets can renege on an agreement causing firms to under invest because of their 
ex-ante expectations of being held-up by the asset-owning firm.  One solution presented 
in the literature is to form an integrated firm boundary.  Acemoglu et al. (2009) used 
contract enforcement costs among various countries to empirically test this theory and 
found that firms in countries with high contracting enforcement costs have a greater 
propensity to vertically integrate.  Shenoy (2012) also determined that vertical integration 
is primarily driven by efficiency. 
 Theoretical work by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Subramanian (2008) stressed 
two mechanisms influencing the boundary decision of firms; ownership of assets and 
access to assets.  They argue these two mechanisms are not analogous to one another and 
just because one has ownership does not mean it also has access to assets.  Subramanian 
(2008) further argues that the transfer of ownership of knowledge assets during a 
merger/acquisition does not necessarily increase access to the knowledge assets 
purchased such as the case of the 2003 AOL acquisition of Netscape.  During the 
Netscape acquisition, a large percentage of Netscape employees left en masse, leaving 
AOL with ownership of the Netscape browser, but the inability to use and further develop 
it. Subramanian (2008) argues that this could be one possible cause of failed mergers 
among high-tech industries. 
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 On the empirical side, the literature has recognized that a boundary formation is 
not simply a binary choice between full integration and no integration, but instead exists 
among a set of strategic alternatives (Williamson, 1975).  Associated literature that 
focuses on the formation of firm boundaries along a continuum generally falls into one of 
three categories: (1) boundary formation in specific industries such as auto-parts 
(Monteverde and Teece, 1982), bio-technology (Pisano, 1989) and pharmaceuticals 
(Pisano, 1990; Higgins, 2007): (2) choosing between alliances and acquisitions within the 
context of foreign market entry (Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Shaver, 1998; Dyer, Kale, 
and Singh, 2004): (3) firm characteristics to run a “horse-race” on competing theories of 
boundary formation (Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). 
 Research on the role of knowledge assets in corporate decisions and firm 
boundary formation has been limited, primarily because of the difficulty in obtaining 
accurate measures of knowledge flow between firms.  In 1996, the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) released an electronic database of patents granted by the 
USPTO.  This data has led to a growth in empirical literature examining the impact of 
knowledge flow on corporate decisions (see Benson, 2009 and Hall et al., 2001 for details 
on this dataset).  Wang et al, (2009) find that increasing the equity based compensation of 
employees achieved an increased rate of self-citations within the firm.  Ziedonis (2004) 
finds that there is a strategic issuance of patents in the product markets to inhibit 
innovation in competing firms.  Studies of the relation between knowledge assets and the 
firm boundary have focused on knowledge innovation and firm value following the 
selection of a particular boundary.  Gomes-Casseres et al. (2006) find that the number of 
patents increases following the formation of alliances and the source of new patents 
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results from the cross-citations between firms.  Many papers (Sevilar and Tian, 2012; 
Anjos and Fracassi, 2012; Bena and Li; 2012) focus on the change in corporate 
innovation following a merger/acquisition.  They find mixed evidence that mergers do 
create synergies between firms, and only in some cases does a merger/acquisition 
subsequently increase the rate of firm innovation and patent generation.  This paper 
compliments this growing body of literature by 1) analyzing the decision to form 
integrative boundaries among a set of boundary choices 2) analyzing the effect of the 
degree of integration on the change in knowledge flow between firms and 3) analyzing 
announcement date effects to see if firms gain value by partnering with other firms where 
the knowledge flow is restricted. 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
 In a Coasian (1937) world without frictions or restrictions to the transfer of 
knowledge between firms, the boundary of the firm is of minor consequence.  In such a 
world, knowledge can flow freely and two firms operating independently are able to gain 
access to each other’s knowledge assets (Subramanian, 2008).5   Assuming there are no 
costs to integrate, the choice of boundary in this world is independent to the flow of 
knowledge between firms since knowledge can flow freely for each boundary choice. 
 In a world with frictions, however, knowledge does not flow freely and access to 
knowledge assets becomes costly.  Firms may purchase knowledge assets, including 
patents, from other firms; however the transfer of ownership does not imply the new 
owner is able to fully utilize and gain access the asset (Subramanian, 2008).  Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) suggest that access to knowledge assets may be more important than the 
                                                 
5
 One can think of knowledge flow similarly to having access to knowledge assets as in Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) and Subramanian (2008). 
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actual ownership of these assets such as in a Grossman and Hart (1986) or Hart and 
Moore (1990) framework.  In such a world, the boundary of the firm will determine the 
level of access to the knowledge asset.  If two firms choose to remain independent, they 
may be unable to knowledge flow may remain restricted, thus minimal knowledge will be 
transferred between them.  Alternatively, if firms choose to closely integrate, the various 
business units can further.  The integration of firms can then facilitate the exchange of 
knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992). When these frictions exist in a Coasian world, the 
boundary of the firm is defined around those costs deemed less costly internally than the 
costs in the outside market.  Consequently, the boundary between firms is defined around 
the costs of knowledge flow.  When restrictions to knowledge flow exist, the internal cost 
of knowledge flow may be less costly than acquiring knowledge assets via the outside 
markets.  Thus, firms may choose a higher level of integration to gain access to 
knowledge assets.   
2.2 The Choice to Form a Partnership 
 In a world where the transfer of knowledge between firms is frictionless, the 
boundary choice of the firms is irrelevant absent of integration costs.  Similarly, when 
firms possess knowledge assets which are easily transferable between firms, firms can 
share access without cost
6
. Other firms have little incentive to form integrative 
boundaries with companies with easily transferrable knowledge assets as doing so will 
not reduce the cost of acquiring knowledge since there is a pre-existing knowledge flow 
between the firms.  Therefore, such firms are more likely to remain independent. 
                                                 
6
 Sending knowledge assets to other firms may not be voluntary.  Knowledge flow between firms may 
occur due to technology spillovers or employees switching companies and bringing over their prior firms’ 
knowledge set (Becker, 1962). 
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 By contrast, when frictions exist that limit the knowledge flow between firms, 
there exist significant costs to transfer knowledge between firms.  Access to the 
knowledge assets by another firm may require the formation of a more integrative 
boundary to facilitate a cost efficient transfer of knowledge.  Partnerships act as a 
mechanism to integrate firms and allow greater access to assets between them.  Therefore 
the probability of a partnership forming should increase when access to a firm’s 
knowledge assets is limited thus restricting the knowledge flow from a firm. 
2.3 The Choice of Firm Boundary 
 Firms with restrictions to knowledge flow may be more likely to form a 
partnership compared to firms with less restrictions.  The question then becomes, what 
form of boundary should a pair of firms choose?  Both strategic alliances and joint 
ventures facilitate access to one another’s knowledge assets and each firm in the 
partnership retains the ownership to its existing knowledge assets in place.  Cooperative 
agreements between partners in a strategic alliance are often established to offer access to 
technology and firm-specific assets for the sharing or co-development of new assets 
(Subramanian, 2008).  The partners in a strategic alliance remain separate legal entities 
thus a strategic alliance most closely resembles an arms-length contract.  Comparatively, 
a joint venture represents a more integrated form of business organization.  Firms in a 
joint venture form a new legal entity in which each firm contributes equity, as well as 
access to technology and firm-specific assets.  Similar to strategic alliances, joint 
ventures allow each firm to retain ownership of its existing knowledge assets. 
 Similar to the choice between a partnership versus no partnership, firms will 
choose their level of integration along two dimensions – the cost of forming a partnership 
13 
 
against the benefits of gaining access to each other’s knowledge assets.  As the level of 
integration increases, so too does its cost (Villalonga and McGahan, 2005).  Therefore, 
firms should form more integrative boundaries when the benefits of gaining access to key 
knowledge assets is significantly high to outweigh the potential integration costs.  For 
firms with easily transferrable knowledge assets, the benefits of increasing the level of 
access are few.  Alternatively, firms with restrictions to knowledge flow can accrue larger 
benefits by the formation of a more integrated partnership. 
 The acquirer’s selection of a target firm may not be as straight-forward.  On one 
hand, a merger/acquisition represents the most integrated form of boundary as an entire 
firm is merged into a single entity.  This change in ownership may grant the greatest level 
of access relative to partnerships.  On the other hand, Subramanian (2008) argues that a 
change in ownership of knowledge assets does not necessarily represent an increase in 
access and it may in fact decrease the access.  Unlike partnerships, where ownership of 
existing knowledge assets does not take place, mergers and acquisitions face this 
confounding factor.  Therefore the implications of the level of knowledge flow on the 
acquirer’s selection of a target remain an empirical question which could go in multiple 
ways. 
2.4 Changes in Boundaries and Firm Cross-Citations 
 If firm-pairs decide to form more integrative boundaries to increase the 
knowledge flow, then the level of integration should be positively related to the increase 
in knowledge flow between firms following the boundary change.  Gomes-Casseres et al. 
(2006) find that alliances facilitate an increase in the flow of technical knowledge 
between firms.  Sevilar and Tian (2012), Anjos and Fracassi (2012), and Bena and Li 
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(2012) have found limited evidence to suggest that mergers are followed by an increase 
in patent creation and corporate innovation.  I extend these findings by proposing that the 
level of integration determines the level of knowledge shared between firms. 
 Paired firms effectively form a single firm entity with a defined boundary around 
and between them.  Both firms determine the boundary by selecting from a set of 
boundary choices.  Firm-pairs with an existing free flow of knowledge should form a less 
integrative boundary.  Consequently, the level of knowledge flow should remain 
relatively constant when the firm boundary changing to a weakly integrated boundary (or 
no boundary change at all).  When a restriction to knowledge flow exists, firms should 
form a more integrative boundary.  This integration should facilitate an increase in 
knowledge between the firms.  Essentially, the level of integration functions as a valve to 
knowledge flow.  As the level of integration increases, so too does the knowledge flow 
between firms.   
2.5 Announcement Date Effects 
 The final question this paper addresses is how the market reacts to announcements 
of a boundary change.  Theoretical literature often discusses the potential synergies 
created by bringing two firms together, yet empirical results find that, on average, 
acquiring firms in a merger/acquisition have negative cumulative abnormal returns.  
Synergies between firms can be created when integration facilitates access to knowledge 
assets that could not be obtained by remaining independent.  If the market believes that 
synergies can be created in a partnership (and/or merger/acquisition) and by integrating 
firms can gain access to another firms’ knowledge assets, then that firm should have 
positive cumulative abnormal returns.  If a merger/acquisition only acts as a change in 
15 
 
ownership of knowledge assets instead of acting as an increase in access, then the market 
may react negatively or little on the announcement date and thus the cumulative 
abnormal returns may be of negative or have little significant difference from zero.  If a 
merger/acquisition acts as an increase to knowledge flow between firms, then the market 
should have a positive cumulative abnormal return on the announcement date. 
3. Using Patents to Measure Knowledge Flow
7
 
 I use United States patents frequently throughout my analysis to measure the 
levels of knowledge flow between firms and the ability to access knowledge assets.  A 
patent is a set of exclusive rights granted by a country to an inventor or a corporate 
assignee for a limited period of time in exchange for public disclosure of the invention or 
procedure.  In the United States, patents are granted by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO), but not every patent applied for is granted.  While data on 
the acceptance rates of patents are unavailable, all accepted patent applications must meet 
the following criteria to be granted by the USPTO: 1) The invention must be novel over 
prior works; 2) The invention must be non-obvious in that the invention must be an 
innovative step; 3) The invention must be useful.  In the United States, a patent is 
awarded to the first ‘person to invent.’8 
 If the USPTO agrees that a patent application has satisfied all the criteria, a patent 
is granted to the inventor(s) of the patent.  The inventor is not a corporation, but a 
person(s).  For most firms in the United States, all ownership rights to the patent are 
forfeited to the employer and the corporation of the employee is recorded as the assignee 
of the patent.  Multiple assignees can exist for the same patent.  Several key pieces of 
                                                 
7
 A special thanks to Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP for the information provided in this section. 
8
 This changed on March 16, 2013, after the sample period, to “first to file”. 
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information are disclosed to the public in a granted patent: 1) the inventor(s) – or the 
persons responsible for the patent, 2) the assignee(s) – a unique identifier of the 
corporation/employer that is assigned to the patent at the time of the patent being granted, 
3) a written description – including any drawings of the invention/process, and 4) a list of 
patent citations used to identify prior patents whose information was useful in the patent 
development.  This list of patent citations of previously granted patents need not come 
from the patenting firm/individual.  It is estimated that approximately half of the patent 
citations are attached by the USPTO, not the firm/individual creating the patent.   
The choice to use patents to analyze knowledge flow is appealing for many 
reasons.  Patents can only be granted if the application is innovative and useful, thus 
helping to eliminate patent applications that have little economic value.  Additionally, 
attached to a granted patent is a list of patent citations, ranging from zero citations, on 
rare occasions, to as high as 785 citations.  This list of patent citations offers tangible 
tracking of the knowledge innovation between and within firms.  Since the citation lists 
are examined and augmented by the USPTO, the tracking of knowledge flow is not 
censored by the firms/individuals creating the patents.  Consequently, an economically 
relevant list of knowledge assets can be credibly tracked.   
It should be noted that corporate patents are not the only source of corporate 
innovation. Certain firms and industries might not participate in the patent process as 
firms may possess proprietary information that they do not wish to disclose.  The use of 
patents is often clustered in certain industries where knowledge is considered a valuable 
asset and where the speed of innovation is relatively high.  Additionally, clustering 
occurs in industries in which the legal ramifications for patent violations are higher.  This 
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clustering is often due to the trade-offs faced by firms applying for patents.  Although 
firms benefit from patent usage by being granted exclusive rights to use, sell, and prevent 
importation of the innovation within the United States for a period of 20 years, patents 
require the disclosure of details about the innovation/process.  The disclosure requires 
that enough information is provided in the body of the patent to enable a person of 
ordinary skill within the field to replicate the innovation. 
4. Data and Variable Construction 
4.1 Sample Construction 
 For partnerships, I collect a sample of strategic alliance and joint ventures from 
the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) from 1986 to 2005 that are matched with firms not 
forming an alliance from the COMPUSTAT database.  Each observation in the SDC 
database represents an event when either a strategic alliance or joint venture has been 
announced.  Strategic alliances and joint ventures offer an ideal setting in which the 
relation between knowledge flow and firm boundaries can be tested as each deal is a 
partnership between firms towards a common purpose/project.  This symmetry allows the 
analysis to be completed on both a firm level and paired-firm level basis.  The sample 
from SDC includes 3,119 completed deals which comprises 2,563 strategic alliances and 
556 joint ventures among 1,908 unique firms that represent a change in the boundary 
between firms.  The data for partnerships is constructed using the process described 
below. 
 I collect firm and deal-level data from SDC’s Joint Venture and Strategic Alliance 
database for deals with an announcement date between 1986 and 2005.  The SDC data is 
not exhaustive and does not include all deals completed during this time period due to 
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inadequate reporting requirements.  The database, however, is the most comprehensive 
source of information on such deals (Subramanian, 2008).  Each deal in the database 
includes a list of participating firms, select firm characteristics, and deal-specific 
characteristics.  To simplify the analysis of the relation between participating firms, I 
restrict the sample to strategic alliances and joint ventures involving two participants.  
Additionally, both firms must be domiciled in the United States.  This exclusion 
addresses two issues: 1) many international deals are for the purpose of market entry and 
risk sharing rather than for the sharing of assets (Villalonga and McGahan, 2005) and 2) 
only limited financial information exists for foreign corporations and joint ventures.  
Additionally, SDC is more comprehensive for domestic firms compared to foreign firms. 
Any strategic alliance that includes an equity transfer as part of the alliance 
agreement is eliminated thereby confirming that only joint ventures contain an equity 
stake in the deal. This step ensures that the study only samples strategic alliances that 
were formed for the purpose of establishing a partnership rather than sampling those 
alliances in which one firm is compensated for access to another firm’s assets.  I further 
restrict the sample by eliminating any observations in which one or both of the firms in 
the deal could be designated as a firm in the financial industry (identified by having an 
SIC code in the 6000’s).  Of the remaining observations, I only retain deals where both 
participants can be matched to the COMPUSTAT database in the year prior to the deal 
announcement, thus resulting in 3,119 deals within 59 two-digit SIC defined industries. 
 I use this set of observations to create two samples for analysis.  The first sample 
comprises individual firm observations.  Although each strategic alliance and joint 
venture is composed of two firms, the firm-level analysis examines the individual firms 
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comprising each pair; thus each firm represents a unique observation.  Consequently, a 
more detailed firm-level analysis is achieved compared to that which could result from 
analyzing the firms as a paired unit.  Because there were 3,119 deals, the analysis at the 
firm level yielded twice that number of observations, or 6,238 firm-year observations 
during the sample period. 
 The second sample comprises units of paired firms.  Since the data were restricted 
to deals between two firms only, every deal in the sample is its own observation.  This 
type of sample has the advantage of being able to analyze the relation between firms 
comprising the pair instead of only analyzing firm-specific characteristics.  However, 
unlike firm-pair analysis in other strains of finance literature (such as 
mergers/acquisitions), strategic alliances and joint ventures are relatively symmetric in 
nature. Deals often lack a dominant member (such as an acquirer firm versus a target firm 
in an M&A deal) thus limiting applicability of firm-specific characteristics at the firm-
pair level.  For example, industry fixed effects cannot be included in the firm-pair 
analysis because multiple industries are represented in one observation.  Similar to the 
firm-level sample, there are 3,119 deals which lead to 3,119 observations at the firm-pair 
level. 
For mergers/acquisitions, only successful deals from the SDC Mergers & 
Acquisitions database from 1986 to 2005 are included.  While data exists for 
mergers/acquisitions as far back as 1971, the time period in the sample is identical to that 
used in the SDC’s Strategic Alliance and Joint Venture database.  All observations from 
SDC’s Merger & Acquisitions database must meet the following criteria to be included in 
the final sample; (1) both the target and acquirer firms must be located in the United 
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States (2) consistent with Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003), each acquirer must hold less than 
50% of the target shares prior to the deal announcement and must have acquired at least 
15% of the target shares during the deal and (3) the acquirer must have a stake larger than 
50% after the merger.  The second condition ensures that the transaction between the two 
firms was economically relevant.  The second and third conditions ensure that the 
acquirer changed from a minority holder of the target’s knowledge assets to a majority 
holder.  Additionally, to be included in the sample, both the target and acquirer firm must 
be able to be matched to the COMPUSTAT database.  This results in a sample of 1,349 
mergers/acquisitions. 
4.2 Firm Boundary Definitions 
Joint ventures and strategic alliances are firm boundaries that exist among a set of 
governance modes (Williamson 1975, 1991; Klein et al., 1978; Hennart, 1993; Villalonga 
and McGahan, 2005).  At one extreme, firms can remain independent of one another 
thereby allowing each firm to remain in control of its own assets.  At the other extreme, 
firms may merge into a single entity in which case assets of both original firms are 
controlled by the new merged firm.  In the middle of this set, though, lie strategic 
alliances and joint ventures.  Strategic alliances are typically mutual agreements to share 
firm resources as defined in the scope of an alliance agreement.  Though resources may 
be shared, all assets remain in control of the original firms.  Joint ventures, by 
comparison, not only provide for the sharing of resources, but also call for equity infusion 
into the venture resulting in a closer boundary than the strategic alliance.  Thus, these two 
organization forms provide a basis for defining the level of integration between each pair 
of firms in the sample.  For each observation, a pair of firms chooses to remain 
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independent, form a strategic alliance, or form a joint venture.
9
  I define the variable 
Structure as a monotonically increasing variable in terms of the level of firm-pair 
integration.  The variable takes a value of ‘0’ if the firms remain independent.  The 
variable takes the value of ‘1’ if the firm-pair forms a strategic alliance.  The value of ‘2’ 
is assigned to those firm-pairs that form a joint venture which is the most integrative 
boundary defined for partnerships.   
 Following Villalonga and McGahan (2005), I also sub-divide the definition of an 
alliance for further analysis.  Four sub-categories among the alliances are created and are 
defined as follows (in increasing order of boundary integration): 1) licensing 
arrangements; 2) non-equity alliances in marketing; 3) non-equity alliances in technology, 
research and development, or manufacturing; and 4) joint ventures.  I then create the 
variable Structure2 to correspond to the degree of firm integration.  The variable takes on 
the value of ‘0’ when no alliance is formed and increases to a value of ‘4’ when a joint 
venture is formed.  Later, I examine the sensitivity of the main results by using this 
expanded boundary definition to analyze the boundary choice within the original 
boundary definitions.  It should be noted that these definitions hold for both the firm and 
the firm-pair level analyses. 
 Unlike partnerships, mergers/acquisitions have a clear separation between the 
firm types that comprise a deal.  While partnerships can be thought of as more symmetric 
in nature, with each firm joining the partnership for a common purpose/project, a 
merger/acquisition is more asymmetrical in nature.  I create the variable Target to denote 
whether or not a firm is a target firm.  The variable takes the value of ‘1’ if a firm is a 
                                                 
9
 For the purposes of this paper, firms remaining independent will still be said to entering into a deal.  
Instead of a deal to integrate, the firms agree to remain independent.  Please see section 6.1 for more 
information on how matched firms enter the sample. 
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target firm and ‘0’ if other.  Depending on the model specification, the variable either 
takes the value of ‘0’ for a non-target firm matched in COMPUSTAT or for the acquiring 
firm in the deal. 
4.3 Restriction to Knowledge Flow 
4.3.1 Patent Self-Citations 
 Patents act as a reservoir of existing knowledge that a firm has previously 
accumulated.  Patent citations provide direct evidence of the path of the knowledge flow 
between firms and within firms, as each patent typically identifies other patents 
constituting the technology on which the patent builds (Wang et al, 2009).  Therefore, the 
frequency of patent citations by the same or different firms can be tabulated.  Prior 
literature has used self-citations as a proxy to measure the amount of firm-specific 
knowledge within a firm (Wang et al, 2009; Subramanian, 2008).  Accordingly, the proxy 
can measure the amount of accumulated knowledge created using established knowledge 
assets (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Teece, 1986).  The higher the percentage of internal 
accumulation, the more likely the firm’s innovative knowledge is firm-specific.  
Moreover, a higher rate of self-citations signals a firm’s capacity to access its own 
knowledge assets and conversely, the inability of outside firms to access those same 
assets thus an indication of a restriction to knowledge flow from the firm. 
 I use the United States patent data provided by Bronwyn Hall’s website10 from 
1976 to 2006 to create proxies for knowledge flow between firms.  Patents from the 
USPTO can be divided into two primary groups
11
, design patents and utility patents.  
Design patents represent a change to the design, and not the functionality of a product 
                                                 
10
 http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/bhdata.html 
11
 Other patent definitions do exist, however, these are minimal in number. 
23 
 
(e.g. a logo change to a soft drink bottle).  A utility patent represents a change to or an 
improvement in the functionality of an existing innovation.  I focus my analysis on utility 
patents as they best exemplify the flow of innovative knowledge.  For each patent, the 
USPTO provides a unique patent number along with a list of assignee numbers exclusive 
to the corporation(s) or individual(s) recognized for creating the patent.  The assignee 
number is a static number given at the time the patent is granted by the USPTO.  To 
capture the dynamic ownership of the patent over time, I combine Hall’s database of 
United States patents, which matches assignee numbers to COMPUSTAT CUSIP and 
GVKEY numbers, with SDC’s Merger and Acquisition database for verification.  For 
each year, I track the GVKEY of the patent owner in Hall’s dynamic table first, which 
tracks GVKEY changes over time.  Next, I confirm whether or not the SDC Mergers and 
Acquisition database contains any acquisitions of greater than 50% of shares each year.  
If an acquisition took place, the GVKEY of the patent is changed for subsequent years to 
the new owner of the patent.  Each patent includes a list of cited patents to which I 
similarly assign a GVKEY.  The Hall dataset of patents granted from 1976 to 2006 
represents 3,093,461 corporate patents containing 23,617,890 citations.  Table I shows 
the USPTO took an average of 2.13 years to grant a patent from the date of application, 
and on average firms took 2.99 years to cite a patent for the first time.  The average 
patent has 7.63 citations attached of which 6.67% are self-citations.  Of firms holding at 
least one patent, firms hold an average of 191.8 patents. 
 The frequency of a firm’s internal patent citations is used to measure how easily a 
firm’s portfolio of patents can be accessed.  Patents that are easily accessible to external 
firms – meaning a firm can apply the information contained in the original patent to 
24 
 
subsequently develop a new innovation – can be traced by viewing the frequency with 
which outside firms cite a patent.  If external firms can easily access a patent, the 
percentage of external citations should be high and thus knowledge flow is greater.  
Alternatively, if a patent is difficult to access, then only the firm who created the patent 
should be able to build upon that patent’s existing knowledge, in which case the 
percentage of outside citations should be low. 
 Two proxies are created to measure the restriction of knowledge flow using a 
firm’s portfolio of patents.  The first method calculates the percentage of patent citations 
that are self-citations using a list of the firm’s own patents.  To measure this, for each 
firm I list all patents created by the firm within the past five years.  Next, I develop from 
that list another list of all citations found in the patents.  I then calculate the frequency of 
self-citations as the number of self-citations found in the patents divided by the total 
number of citations found in the patents.  Such that: 
               
∑                  
    
    
∑                   
    
    
      (1) 
Where Self Citations is the total number of self-citations a firm has accumulated over the 
previous five years and Total Citations is the total number of citations included in all 
patents created by firm j over the previous five years.  This measure closely reflects the 
self-citations measure used in prior literature (Wang et al., 2009; Bena and Li, 2012). 
The second measure examines the frequency with which self-citations are made 
on a firm’s patents.  To create this proxy, I first list all citations made to a firm’s patents 
within the past five years, though the patent can be of any age.  Citations on a firm’s 
patents can come from two sources.  A firm can cite itself (self-citation) or an external 
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firm can cite the company.  I calculate the frequency in which the citations to the firm are 
self-citations.  The second measure is thus: 
               
∑                  
    
    
∑                    
    
    
      (2) 
where Patent Citations is the total number of citations made within the past five years on 
any of firm j’s patents.  Appendix C provides an illustration of the differences between 
these two proxies, which have a correlation coefficient of 0.739. 
4.3.2 Years to First Citation 
 In addition to patent self-citations, I also create a measure identifying the number 
of years it takes external firms to cite a firm’s patents.  I denote this measure as years to 
citation or YTC.  The ease in knowledge can flow between firms is indicated by the speed 
in which the patent is cited and used by another firm.  This is measured by calculating the 
average length of time until a patent’s first citation by another firm.  For each patent a 
firm applied for prior to the deal announcement date, I list patents that are cited both 
patents also prior to the announcement year of the deal.
12
  For each citation, I calculate 
the difference between the citing year and application year of the firm’s patent.  I employ 
two methods of calculation if the patent has yet to be cited.  The first is to ignore that 
patent from calculation.  The second method, used in untabulated results, is to calculate 
the value as the difference between the deal year and the application year.  For each 
patent, I then calculate a value representing the minimum number of years of all patents 
citing the firm’s patent.  This value is then averaged across all patents created by the firm 
prior to the announcement year of the deal such that: 
                                                 
12
 In untabulated results, I relax this restriction and create a list of citing patents even if they occur after 
announcement date of the deal. 
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    (3) 
where n is the number of patents owned by firm j.   
4.4 Patent Cross-Citations 
 In order to measure the effects of boundary integration on knowledge flow, I 
calculate the percentage of citations that are cross-cited between firms.  While self-
citations are attributable to a specific firm, cross-citations are attributable firm-pair.  If 
knowledge flow between two firms increases, so too should the frequency in which firms 
cite one another’s patents.  The percentage of cross-citations between firms is calculated 
by first tabulating the number of citations in which either firm has cited the other within 
two years of the date of interest
13
.  This figure is standardized by dividing aggregate 
number of citations of both firms during those two years to give a percentage of all 
citations which are cross-citations. 
4.5 Vertical Relatedness/Horizontal Relatedness 
 I control for business connections by measuring vertical and horizontal 
relatedness.  To control for vertical relatedness, I use data from the United States Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA) which publishes the benchmark input-output accounts for 
the United States economy every five years.  The BEA’s ‘Detailed Use’ table provides a 
matrix of commodity flows to and from each pair of input-output industries.  Fan and 
Lang (2000) IO-SIC concordance table is used to match the four-digit SIC codes of both 
parties in the sample to the six-digit IO codes provided by the BEA.  Prior research 
suggests that firms move through industries over time (Kahle and Walkling, 1996) and 
that the input-output relations change over time (Shenoy, 2012); therefore I apply the 
                                                 
13
 A time frame of two years is used due to the time frame of the diff-in-diff methodology employed to 
measure changes in cross-citations. 
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‘Use’ tables in the following way.  The 1987 ‘Use’ table is provided for announcements 
of deals made between 1986 and 1989.  The 1992, 1997, and 2002 ‘Use’ tables provide 
the deal information for the years 1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2005 respectively. 
 To identify if the firms in the sample are vertically related, I employ the approach 
motivated by Fan and Goyal (2006) and Shenoy (2012).  For every deal, I calculate a 
Vertically Related Coefficient (VRC) as follows: (i) For every dollar of Firm A’s industry 
total output, find the dollar flow from Firm A’s industry to Firm B’s industry (V1,AB), 
and the dollar flow from Firm B’s industry to Firm A’s industry (V1,BA), and (ii) For 
every dollar of Firm B’s industry total output, find the dollar flow from Firm A’s industry 
to Firm B’s industry (V2,AB) and the dollar flow from Firm B’s industry to Firm A’s 
industry (V2,BA).  If Max[(V1,AB),(V1,BA)] or Max[(V2,AB),(V2,BA)] is greater than 
2% then these firms are defined as vertically related.
14
  Since prior research has shown 
that vertical relatedness can exist within the same industry, these firm pairs are not 
dropped from the above calculation. 
 Horizontal relatedness is defined by the SIC pairing between the firms.  If the 
firms are within the same 4-digit SIC defined category, the variable HOR is defined as ‘4’.  
Likewise, if the two firms only share a 3-digit SIC code, HOR is defined as to ‘3’ and so 
on.  If the firms do not fall into any of the same SIC industry codes, HOR is defined as 
‘0’. 
4.6 Market Prices and Announcement Dates 
 In order to calculate abnormal returns around the announcement dates of deals, I 
merge the SDC partnership and merger/acquisition data with the CRSP daily stock price 
data.  Market adjusted returns are calculated at day intervals of t-1 to t+1, t-2 to t+2, and 
                                                 
14
 For robustness, the variable VRC5 is also created to define vertical relatedness at the 5% level. 
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t-5 to t+5 where t=0 is the announcement date of the deal.  I calculate abnormal returns 
using the market model.  Since announcement dates in SDC are unreliable (Villalonga 
and McGahan, 2005), I attempt to verify dates through a combination of sources.  I gather 
dates from SDC, Lexis-Nexis, as well as press releases from corporate and trade websites.  
When multiple dates are noted for the same deal, I use the dates found in news sources.  
If multiple dates exist among the various news sources, the first chronologic date is 
selected. 
4.7 Other Control Variables 
 Since firms may choose to engage in alliances for purposes other than acquiring 
access to patents, a series of control variables is used.  Because larger firms tend to have 
the resources available to form strategic alliances and joint ventures, firm size is 
controlled for by using the Total Assets (in $millions) variable found in COMPUSTAT.  
When using this measure (and all measures calculated at the firm-level), it is important to 
note that these firm-level variables do not apply for the firm-pair analysis.  Unlike 
mergers and acquisitions, strategic alliances and joint ventures are more symmetric in 
nature and therefore the firm-level variables must also be converted to a firm-pair level 
variable.  For example, the size variable cannot be put into an empirical model at the 
firm-pair level for Firm A and Firm B as either firm could be Firm A or Firm B.  
Therefore, following Lindsey (2008), and Villalonga and McGahan (2005), I calculate 
firm-pair variables at the firm-pair level by using either an average or a relative approach.  
The average approach takes the average of the two firm-level variables and is designated 
in this paper as AVG(‘variable’) whereas the relative approach is calculated by dividing 
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the larger of the two values by the smaller of the two values and is designated in this 
paper as REL(‘variable’). 
It is also possible that firms may form partnerships due to the presence of growth 
opportunities.  Since patents may be indicative of these growth opportunities, I include 
Tobin’s Q as a control variable.  Similarly, firms forming partnerships may be more R&D 
intensive.  While R&D may be related to patent usage, this paper emphasizes the degree 
of restriction to knowledge flow conditional on the levels of R&D.  I therefore control for 
R&D intensity by calculating R&D expenditures as a percentage of total assets.  If firms 
do not list R&D expenditures, it is assumed to be zero.  I also use the COMPUSTAT 
segment data to calculate the number of unique business segments in each firm.
15
  
Evidence found in Villalonga and McGahan (2005) suggests that firms with multiple 
business segments are likely to need outside sources of knowledge and are, thus, more 
likely to form an alliance. 
Firms may form partnerships for other strategic purposes besides access to 
knowledge assets, including access to markets unavailable to them in their current 
geographic location.  Alternatively, alliances may cluster in certain geographic locations 
such as the Silicon Valley or the northeastern United States (e.g. New York and Boston).  
I therefore control for the distance between firms as determined by miles “as the crow 
flies”.  Lastly, I control for profitability as measured by the firm’s ROA.  Variables are 
winsorized at the 2% level (results hold at 1% and un-winsorized) and are lagged one 
year from the announcement date of the deal.  
 
                                                 
15
 For information of how I calculate the number of business segments, see the methods described in Berger 
and Ofek (1995). 
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5. Empirical Methodology 
5.1 Boundary Choice 
5.1.1 Defining the Observation 
 A natural design for the data setup would be one observation for each deal in the 
datasets.  A deal comprises a joint decision by multiple firms (which I limit to two firms 
for testing purposes).  For mergers/acquisitions, all firm- and deal-specific characteristics 
are retained in a single observation since there is a natural separation between target and 
acquirer firm (for example, I can include an industry fixed effect for target and industry 
fixed effect for acquirer).  In partnerships, no natural separation exists between partnering 
firms thus firm-level characteristics must be converted to firm-pair characteristics.  
Variables such as firm size and R&D intensity must be replaced with the appropriate pair 
descriptors such as average or relative measurements.  Industry fixed effects cannot be 
used in this case due to the firm specificity of the variable.  
In order to resolve this issue, I use two methods to define the observation.  The 
first method utilizes firm-level observations similar to Villalonga and McGahan (2005) in 
which each strategic alliance or joint venture produces two observations.  The empirical 
structure of a deal is two observations for each deal: 
                                                                   
and 
                                                                   
where A and B represent the two respective firms in a partnership.  Alternatively, I use a 
second method similar to that of Lindsey (2008) which analyzes all observations at the 
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firm-pair level which yields one observation per deal.  In this case, the empirical structure 
of a deal is: 
                                                                                                          
where Deal Specific Variables are variables unique to the firm-pair (such as distance or 
vertical relatedness) and Relative Firm Specific Variables are firm-level variables 
converted to firm-pair descriptors (such as average size of firms and relative size of firms  
5.1.2 Observation Matching within COMPUSTAT: The Primary Pool 
Firm pairs that have completed deals comprise the samples from SDC’s Strategic 
Alliance and Joint Venture and SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions datasets.  The datasets, 
however, do not identify counterfactuals – firms that could have completed a deal, but did 
not.  Although one method to identify a counterfactual may be to include all possible 
firm-pair combinations in a given year, the large number of potential observations and the 
dilution of the original set of completed deals would make this method infeasible and 
impractical.  These next two sections are dedicated to the methodology and matching 
technique used to identify potential firms that were likely to form partnerships or 
mergers/acquisitions, but that did not.  The techniques employed are valid for both the 
firm-pair and firm-level sample constructions. 
 While each firm-pair found in the data forms either a partnership or merger, there 
were many firms that could have entered into a deal with either firm, but chose not to.  
Thus, I have chosen to identify these firms as a matched sample.  I follow a process in the 
spirit of Lindsey (2008) and Bena and Li (2012) in forming pair-wise matches.  The 
process assumes that when firms enter a deal, they typically have a particular project in 
mind when deciding their partnering firm.  These firms will seek partners possessing 
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certain complimentary skill sets (Lindsey, 2008).  Since there are two firms in each firm-
pair observation, each firm in that pair seeks a particular set of skills.  Consider, for 
example, a small IT/hardware company and a large software developer.  The IT/hardware 
company may be looking to form an alliance with a large software developer (and vice 
versa) to bring a new product idea to market.  The IT/hardware company can choose from 
a selection of software developers.  Alternatively, the software developer can choose 
from a selection of IT/hardware companies.  Therefore, for each firm-pair, I select two 
counter-factual observations, one for each firm in the firm-pair.  Since each firm has a 
particular set of skills in mind, I match firms by industry as well as size characteristics.
16
   
 I define the SDC/COMPUSTAT matched dataset as the primary pool of matched 
observations as this will be the main dataset used throughout my analysis.  I use 
COMPUSTAT to identify firms likely to engage in a strategic alliance or joint venture, 
but ultimately fail to do so.  In order to match firms, I employ a propensity score match 
using the following procedure.  For each firm in a firm-pair found in SDC, I compile a set 
of potential counterfactuals from COMPUSTAT based on the partner’s industry and size.  
Industry is determined by the 4-digit SIC code.  I run a propensity score match and select 
the closest matched firm that did not form an alliance.  If no suitable match exists, I relax 
the restriction of a 4-digit SIC code to a 3-digit SIC code and re-run the propensity score.  
I continue to relax the industry restriction until a match is found.  If no suitable matches 
can be made for either firm in a firm-pair, then the original firm pair is discarded from the 
sample.  Using COMPUSTAT to identify counterfactuals has the advantage of providing 
                                                 
16
 In untabulated results, I also match for R&D intensity and patent usage one year prior to the deal 
announcement date.  While doing so decreases the significance of R&D in subsequent multivariate tests, 
the main results remain relatively unchanged. 
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a wide selection of firms.  Therefore, I am better able to find a close match using firm 
characteristics.   
5.1.3 Observation Matching within SDC: The Secondary Pool 
 Because the primary pool of matched firms comes from the universe of 
COMPUSTAT, identification problems may still exist.  The resulting matches may not be 
able to properly identify firms needing to form an alliance.  The primary pool selects 
matches based on firms that could enter an alliance and not firms that would enter an 
alliance.  To address this issue, a second matching scheme is developed to restrict 
matching to firms who will enter an alliance during a given time period.  Instead of using 
COMPUSTAT to generate matches, matched firms are generated using the original 
dataset from SDC’s Strategic Alliance and Joint Venture database.17  The advantage of 
using this data restriction is that matches identifies matches that are already known to 
form an alliance.  One disadvantage of this method is that the matching scheme can only 
be used in a firm-pair analysis because the matching requires re-using in-sample firms.  If 
this dataset were used at the firm level analysis, counterfactuals would be brought into 
the sample that are the same observations as the original data.  Another disadvantage is 
the potentially smaller number of matches resulting from the sample size of SDC firms 
compared to that of COMPUSTAT.  This matched dataset is referred to as the secondary 
pool throughout the remainder of the paper. 
 To identify matches in the secondary pool, I use a multi-stage selection process 
similar to that of Lindsey (2008) and Bena and Li (2012).  The goal of the matching 
process is to match a similar firm-pair as the original observation.  Similar to the process 
                                                 
17
 Since this matching technique is restricted to firm-pair analysis of cross-citations which cannot be done 
using mergers/acquisitions, this sample is only used in the analysis of partnerships 
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for the primary pool, I create a list of matches for each firm in the firm pair by finding all 
firms in the SDC database with the same 4-digit SIC code as the partner firm.  This list 
becomes a selection of firms who potentially could have formed an alliance, but did not.  
From the list of potential firms, I identify the industry of the actual partnering firm at the 
2-digit SIC code level or higher.  This ensures that the match is done by firms attempting 
to form an alliance and that the alliance is with a firm similar to the original.
18
  If more 
than one firm exists at this stage, I then match by total assets.  If no matches exist, I relax 
the restriction of matching to a 4-digit SIC code until a match is identified.  
5.2 Changes in Knowledge Flow after Boundary Change 
5.2.1 Differences in Differences 
 I use a difference-in-difference approach to identify the changes in knowledge 
flow before and after the announcement date of the alliance.  The difference-in-difference 
method is done at the firm-pair level where I compare the knowledge flow between firm-
pairs before and after the announcement date.  To identify the untreated group, I use both 
the primary and secondary pool of matched observations to track those firm-pairs over 
the same window of time as the treated group.  The treated group comprises those firms 
forming a strategic alliance or joint venture in which a boundary change is the identified 
treatment effect.  Mergers/acquisitions are omitted from the analysis since I cannot track 
the change in cross-citations between the firm-pair after the merger has been completed 
since only one firm remains in the data.  The empirical model is as follows: 
                  
                                                                (4) 
 
                                                 
18
 See Appendix B for a demonstration. 
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5.2.2 Incubation Bias 
 One issue with the difference-in-difference approach is that it requires an 
extended panel of data after the announcement date of the deal.  When using information 
from the USPTO, a significant drop of observations is noticed in the latter part of the 
sample due to the incubation bias in the data.  While patents may be applied for during a 
given year, it can take several years for the patents to be granted by the USPTO.  Only 
granted patents show up in the dataset.  Many patents will still be under review at the 
USPTO and not available in the patent database towards the end of the sample period 
even though they have been applied for.  Therefore, when using the difference-in-
difference approach, the data is truncated to only use those announcements prior to and 
including the year 2000.  This restricts the data to a time period less affected by the 
incubation bias. 
6. Summary Statistics 
 Analysis is done using two types of observations.  Firm-year observations contain 
data specific to a single firm in the firm-pair during a given year (such as size, ROA, or 
Tobin’s Q) while firm-pair year level data contains data specific to the firm-pair during a 
given year (such as existing cross-citations, structure formed, average size, etc.).   
 Table II reports the number of strategic alliances and joint ventures by year.  It is 
interesting to note that there is a large increase in the number of deals observed in the 
1990’s during the time of the dot-com boom in the United States.  Subramanian (2008) 
notes, however, that there could be fewer deals in the later 1980’s due to the less stringent 
reporting details during that time.  Table III reports strategic alliances and joint ventures 
by industry as well as patent usage among SIC 2-digit industries.  Since each firm-pair 
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comprises two firms that can be from differing industries, the analysis for Table III is 
done at the firm level.  There is a clustering of observations for deals among certain 
industries such as Business Services (SIC 7300, 1,734 observations), Industrial and 
Machinery Equipment (SIC 3500, 893 observations), and Chemical & Allied Products 
(SIC 2800, 759 observations).  In general, patent usage, or firms being granted at least 
one patent between 1976 and 2006, is clustered among the 2000 and 3000 4-digit SIC 
industry codes.  However, other industries such as Engineering & Management Services 
(SIC 8700, 70.59% patent use) also exhibit higher levels of patent usage. 
   I pay close attention to the possibility of certain selection biases being introduced 
into the sample.  Although the primary pool and secondary pool of matched firms attempt 
to create matched counterfactuals, the matching process eliminates firms from certain 
industries and with certain characteristics.  Table IV presents five panels of descriptive 
statistics of several groups of firms.  Panel A displays descriptive statistics of all 
COMPUSTAT firms from 1986 through 2005.  Panel B presents descriptive statistics for 
all matched firms from the primary pool coming from COMPUSTAT.  In general, 
matched firms are larger, more profitable, and are more R&D intensive than the firms in 
the general pool of COMPUSTAT firms. 
 Panels C through E examine the firm-level descriptive statistics for all firms in the 
sample who had either a strategic alliance or joint venture during the sample period.  
Panel C represents firms during the announcement year that entered into either a strategic 
alliance or joint venture during the sample period.  Panel D and E look at the firms during 
the announcement year of the strategic alliances and joint ventures respectively.  Firms in 
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strategic alliances seem smaller, more likely to use patents, and more R&D intensive than 
firms in joint ventures. 
 My analysis is only appropriate for firms that use patents because the 
measurements of knowledge flow are created using patent data.  Firms may not use 
patents for a variety of reasons, which, among others, includes a desire to keep their 
internally created knowledge assets private and out of the patent process.  These firms 
may wish to render their knowledge assets as proprietary information.  Alternatively, 
firms may not be knowledge intensive, thus having few potential patents to create.  It is 
therefore difficult to say whether firms without knowledge assets actually create a 
significant restriction to knowledge flow or not. Firms may have few knowledge assets 
needed by other firms.  Such observations will not show up in the multivariate analysis. 
 Tables VI and VII present descriptive statistics and differences along two 
dimensions: firms using/not using patents and firms forming/not forming a boundary.  
Panel A of Table VI presents descriptive statistics for firms who have engaged in at least 
one boundary change during the sample period and have at least one patent granted to 
them between 1976 and 2006.  Panel B presents descriptive statistics for firms who have 
engaged in at least one boundary change during the sample period and who have not been 
granted any patents between 1976 and 2006.  Panel C presents descriptive statistics for all 
COMPUSTAT firms not involved in a strategic alliance or joint venture during the 
sample period and have been granted at least one patent between 1976 and 2006.  Finally, 
Panel D presents descriptive statistics of firms not engaged in a boundary change nor 
granted any patents by the USPTO.  Not surprisingly, firms with patents do tend to be 
larger, more profitable, and more R&D intensive. 
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7. Results and Discussion 
7.1 The firm’s propensity to form a strategic alliance or joint venture 
 What firm characteristics drive a firm’s choice to enter into a partnership with 
another firm?  To answer this question, I first look at the univariate differences of firms 
forming a partnership versus those not forming a partnership during the same year.  Firms 
not forming a partnership are matched using the primary pool of matched firms derived 
from COMPUSTAT. 
 Table VII presents univariate difference of sub-samples along two dimensions: 
firms forming boundaries and firms using patents at least once from 1976 through 2006.  
Firms using patents are significantly larger, have more growth potential (as measured by 
Tobin’s Q), are more profitable, and not surprisingly, have higher R&D intensity.  Firms 
forming boundary changes are also larger, suggesting it takes more resources to form a 
partnership.  Firms forming partnerships also have a higher Tobin’s Q, which is 
indicative of a partner selection based on a firms’ perceived growth potential.  
Additionally, firms forming partnerships are more profitable and more R&D intensitve.  
Without the use of patents, I cannot examine the differences in the restrictions to 
knowledge flow between those firms who use patents and those who do not.  The 
univariate differences of restrictions to knowledge flow between firms forming a 
partnership and the matched sample of firms that do not are positive and significant for 
the two proxies using percentage of self-citations (RESTRICT1 and RESTRICT2).  Thus, 
firms with a higher frequency of self-citations and more firm-specific knowledge are also 
more likely to form a partnership.  The univariate difference for years to first citation 
(YTC) tells another story, with no significant difference between the two samples.  This is 
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not surprising for two reasons.  First, there is a sizable negative correlation between R&D 
intensity and years to first citation.  Since firms that do not form partnerships are also 
firms with low R&D intensity, the confounding effects are exhibited at the univariate 
level.  Second, unlike using percentage of self-citations, which is standardized by the 
total number of citations, years to first citation is not standardized, which introduces the 
confounding effect of the economic relevance of the patent which would weaken the 
results. 
 Table VIII presents coefficient estimates of the probability to form a partnership 
in a multivariate framework.  I employ two econometric models to estimate the 
propensity of firm to enter into either a strategic alliance or joint venture.  The first 
method I use is a binary probit model.  A probit model allows me to estimate unbiased 
consistent estimators when fixed-effects are not included due to the non-linear nature of 
the probit model.  However, the omission of fixed-effects may be problematic.  The data 
suggest time-varying changes in the use of patents as well as the clustering of patent 
usage within certain industries.  Results using a non-linear model without fixed-effects 
may be spurious due to these unobserved characteristics.  To address this issue, I also 
employ a linear probability model that permits year and industry fixed-effects.  While the 
use of a linear probability model assumes that the dependent variable is continuous, the 
model still presents unbiased estimators at the cost of efficiency.  Maddala (1985) 
contends that results from a linear probability model tend to be over-rejected. 
 Table VIII uses a modification of the variable Structure (called Boundary) as the 
dependent variable.  Boundary takes the value of ‘0’ if the firm in the sample forms 
neither a strategic alliance nor a joint venture and takes the value of ‘1’ if it does.  
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Columns (A) – (C) utilize the binary probit model to estimate the probability of forming a 
partnership while Columns (D) – (F) utilize the linear probability model with industry 
fixed-effects set at the 2-digit SIC level.  In all specifications, using all measures of 
knowledge flow restriction, I show that firms are more likely to form a partnership when 
their knowledge assets are more difficult for other firms to access.  In five of the six 
model specifications, the coefficients of knowledge flow restriction are significant at the 
1% level.  Similar to the univariate results, the years to first citation measure is weaker 
than that of the percentage of self-citation measures. 
 A large portion of the firms sampled from the SDC database form strategic 
alliances rather than joint ventures.  I next show that the results for the propensity to form 
a partnership based on restrictions to knowledge flow is not driven solely by either 
boundary type.  In Table IX, I repeat the analysis from Table VIII using binary probit 
models over two sub-samples.  Columns (A) – (C) use the sub-sample of strategic 
alliances and their respective match from the primary pool of matched firms.  Columns 
(D) – (F) use the sub-sample of joint ventures and their respective matched firms.  Once 
again I use the dependent variable Boundary to estimate the probability of forming a 
given partnership.  I continue to find a positive and highly statistically significant 
relationship between knowledge flow restrictions and the propensity to form a 
partnership regardless of the sub-sample chosen.  It is worth noting that while R&D 
intensity and Tobin’s Q appear to have a positive association with the propensity to form 
a strategic alliance, the results are less robust for joint ventures.  My results indicate that 
explanatory variables may not be directionally monotonic across boundary choices. 
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7.2 Choice of Firm Boundary 
 Is the restriction to knowledge flow associated with the level of integration chosen 
for partnerships?  In order to answer this question I separate boundary selections based on 
the choice between strategic alliances and joint ventures.  Analyzing strategic alliances 
and joint ventures allows me to examine two business organization structures that 
increase the level of access to knowledge assets as integration increases, but leave the 
level of ownership of existing knowledge assets unchanged.  Unlike a merger/acquisition, 
there is no asymmetric transfer of ownership of knowledge assets between firms in a 
partnership. 
 Table X presents two sets of empirical models exploring the boundary choice of 
firms.  Columns (A) – (C) show a binary probit model using the dependent variable JVSA 
which takes the value of ‘1’ for a joint venture and ‘0’ for strategic alliance.  Though 
counterfactuals are eliminated from these tests, results do allow for a direct comparison 
between strategic alliances and joint ventures.  I show that for all measures of knowledge 
flow restriction, I find a positive association between firms’ knowledge flow restrictions 
and the probability of these firms forming a more integrative boundary.  I show similar 
results in Columns (D) – (F) using an ordered probit model which include matched firms 
from the primary pool of COMPUSTAT firms. 
It is worth noting that the relation between R&D intensity and Tobin’s Q switch 
signs between the two model specifications.  This is an indication that suggests that firms 
can choose different levels of integration for different reasons and not all explanatory 
variables are directionally monotonic in nature.  Coefficient estimates for an ordered 
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probit model assume the choice between lower levels of integration is similar in direction 
to the choice between higher levels of integration. 
 In Table XI, I run a two-stage selection model (similar to a Heckman model).  A 
binary probit model containing only strategic alliances and joint ventures is a model 
conditional on a partnership being formed.  An ordered probit including the matched 
sample does not condition on a partnership being formed, but does assume correlations 
will remain in the same direction between various boundary choices.  I use a probit model 
to estimate the first-stage likelihood of forming a partnership.  I instrument for the 
boundary choice by using the number of segments a firm has.  Firms with multiple 
segments are more likely to need external sources of knowledge and are therefore likely 
to form a partnership.  Firms with multiple segments have been found to have a high 
likelihood to form mergers/acquisitions (Villalonga and McGahan, 2005), but there is 
less correlation between the choice of strategic alliance and joint venture.  In the 
regression analysis, I use the results from Column (A) – (C) of Table VIII for the first 
stage model and use a linear probability model with and without fixed effects for the 
second stage.  The results hold irrespective of model specification. 
 In terms of robustness with previous results, the analysis is repeated over various 
alternative model specifications.  Columns (A) – (B) of Table XII use a multinomial 
conditional logit model to take advantage of the full power of the sample.  The model sets 
non-alliance firms as the base case and models the choice of both a strategic alliance and 
joint venture against the base.  Columns (C) – (D) repeat the ordered probit specification 
found in Table X, Columns (D) and (F), using a linear probability model with industry 
and year fixed-effects.  Additionally, since not all industries rely on patents as their 
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source of knowledge assets, I restrict the sample in Columns (E) – (F) to industries with 
high patent use as these are the firms in which access to knowledge assets may matter 
most.  I restrict the sample to those firms found in the SIC 2000 and SIC 3000 1-digit 
industries and employ a linear probability model with industry and firm fixed-effects.  In 
all specifications, prior results hold as the level of knowledge flow restrictions has a 
positive relation to the level of integration chosen in a partnership. 
 Next, I focus on the knowledge flow restrictions at the firm-pair level.  Unlike the 
firm-level analysis that consisted of two observations for each deal, the firm-pair level 
analysis consists of one observation per deal.  For a partnership, all firm-pair 
observations consist of firm-pair characteristics.  I re-run the empirical tests to estimate 
the probability of each firm-pair forming a partnership and include firm-pair 
characteristics such as vertical relatedness, distance, and horizontal relatedness between 
firms in each observation.  A binary probit model is used in Columns (A) – (C) in Table 
XIII to show that the inclusion of firm-pair level characteristics minimally affects the 
relation between knowledge flow restrictions and the choice between strategic alliance 
and joint venture.  Similarly, an ordered probit model is used in Columns (D) – (F) to 
show that the results hold with the inclusion of the primary pool of matched observations. 
 Since the boundary choice between strategic alliance and joint venture may be 
influenced by unobserved boundary effects, I use the definitions of Villalonga and 
McGahan (2005) to create sub-boundary definitions within strategic alliances.  Strategic 
alliances are broken up into three different groups, listed in order of boundary integration: 
licensing agreements, marketing agreements, and R&D / Technology / Manufacturing 
agreements. 
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 Using a series of probit models presented in Table XIV I show that even within 
the strategic alliance definition, the level of restriction to knowledge flow affects the 
likelihood of forming a more integrative boundary.  An ordered probit model is used in 
Columns (A) and (C) across the full sample using the dependent variable Structure2 as 
the range of options (from no partnership, to the sub-types of strategic alliances, and to 
joint ventures).  An ordered probit model is also used in Columns (B) and (D), but limits 
the sample to strategic alliance sub-types only.  R&D / Technology / Manufacturing 
agreements are those agreements most likely to involve knowledge intensive firms with 
knowledge assets that may be the most difficult to access and utilize by other firms.  
Binary probit models in Columns (E) – (F) appear to indicate that it is still more likely 
that firms with higher restrictions to knowledge flow will form joint ventures rather than 
these narrowly defined strategic alliances.  I re-run my analysis at the firm-pair level in 
Table XV and find similar results. 
7.3 Patent creation changes pre/post partnership 
One of the goals a firms has in creating a new relationship with a partnering firm 
is to create synergies to further gain a competitive advantage in the product market 
(Hoberg and Philips, 2010).  By gaining access to knowledge assets, a firm, and its 
partner, can expand on both firms’ existing assets to create new corporate innovations.  If 
two firms form a partnership due to a lack of access to each other’s knowledge assets and 
an impedance to knowledge flow, a more integrative boundary should cause an increase 
in the level of cross-citation post partnership.  Alternatively, firm-pairs with little 
impedance to the knowledge flow between them should choose a less integrative form of 
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firm boundary and the impact of a partnership (or lack thereof) should minimally affect 
the level of patents cross-cited in the partnership.   
 I employ a difference-in-difference model to measure the changes in firm-pair 
attributes around a window of +/- two years of the announcement date of the partnership.  
I use the two-year period to calculate the percentage of firm cross-citations to ensure that 
the summation of cross-citations does not include cross-citations prior to the 
announcement date of the partnership.  Since the dependent variable and the variable of 
interest (the level of firm integration) are both firm-pair specific attributes, I can employ 
two different matched samples.  The first sample is the primary pool of matched samples 
which has been used widely in the analysis.  The second source of matched firms is the 
secondary pool which draws from the SDC Strategic Alliance and Joint Venture database.  
By using the secondary pool of matched firms, I can match by firms that not only could 
form a partnership, but, in fact did so, albeit with another firm.  Each matched dataset 
acts as the untreated group, while those firm-pairs who did form a partnership act as the 
treated group in the diff-in-diff. 
 Panels (A) – (D) in Table XVI shows the univariate changes over time by the 
boundary choice selected.  A comparison of the change in cross-citations in Panel (A) 
and (B), clearly shows that firms forming partnerships are more likely to cross-cite other 
firms who form partnerships.  Firms forming partnerships have 53.0% more cross-
citations with other firms forming partnerships as compared to the matched firms from 
COMPUSTAT.  I show in Panels (C) and (D) that an increase in the level of boundary 
integration causes a larger, univariate change in percentage of cross-citations between 
firms.  Firms forming strategic alliances exhibit an 84.8% increase in the percentage of 
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cross-citation change as compared to the COMPUSTAT matched firms.  Joint ventures 
are even higher at 180.3% higher than their COMPUSTAT counterparts. 
 The diff-in-diff approach in Table XVII shows that the level of boundary 
integration affects the level of cross-citations between firms.  Firms remaining 
independent of each other exhibit a smaller increase in the percentage of cross-citations, 
compared to both strategic alliances and joint ventures.  Additionally, strategic alliances 
exhibit a smaller increase in the percentage of cross-citations after the deal announcement 
as compared to firms forming joint ventures.  The results hold regardless of whether the 
matched firms come from COMPUSTAT (Columns (A) – (B)) or SDC’s Strategic 
Alliance and Joint Venture database (Columns (D) – (E)). 
7.4 Mergers and Acquisitions  
 Mergers/acquisitions represent a deal structure distinct from a partnership.  
Partnerships represent a symmetric deal where both parties agree to enter into an 
agreement without losing ownership of their existing knowledge assets.  Typically, 
neither firm is compensated for entering the partnership.  Even with joint ventures, equity 
stakes are only carved out for the newly created legal entity and not an ownership stake in 
the partnering firm.  Mergers/acquisitions represent asymmetrical deals with one party 
(the acquirer) compensating the other party (the target) in return for ownership of the 
target firm’s assets.  While partnering firms form a strategic alliance or joint venture for a 
common goal/project, it is the acquiring firm who is searching for certain firm 
characteristics in a target and typically not vice-versa (Subramanian, 2008). 
 Table XVIII illustrates the differences between firms in a merger/acquisition and 
COMPUSTAT firms.  It shows that acquirers are typically larger firms with growth 
47 
 
potential who seek out small, R&D intensive firms with low profitability.  Despite having 
high R&D intensity, target firms have lower levels of restriction to knowledge flow 
compared to acquirer firms.  Bena and Li (2012) find consistent results in their data and 
argue that acquirers buy R&D intensive target firms before they are able fully develop 
and bring their research to the patent stage. 
 Table XIX shows the median relative differences between firms of strategic 
alliances, joint ventures and mergers/acquisitions.  Since relative measures can cause 
large outliers in the data, I focus on medians rather than averages.  Strategic alliances are 
typically the smallest in scope for a firm, often revolving are a subset of firms operations 
(such as R&D or marketing).  This allows for a wide range of firms to form an alliance 
and often results in a wider divergence of firm-characteristics than joint ventures and 
mergers/acquisitions.  Relative Tobin’s Q, the difference in R&D intensity, and the 
difference in ROA, are all highest for strategic alliances compared to both joint ventures 
and mergers/acquisitions.  However, relative size is still less divergent for strategic 
alliances than for joint ventures which are the least divergent in firm-characteristics in 
almost every category except ROA, where both mergers/acquisitions and joint ventures 
have nearly identical differences.  Mergers/acquisitions are the most divergent in terms of 
firm size and knowledge flow restrictions.  Mergers/acquisitions also have a median 
horizontal relatedness value of 3.0, meaning the majority of mergers/acquisitions in the 
sample seem to be more horizontally related deals within the same 3-digit SIC defined 
industry.  Compared to medians of 1.0 for both strategic alliances and joint ventures, 
mergers/acquisitions may be more likely to be chosen as the vehicle to acquire 
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competitors in the product market whereas strategic alliances/joint ventures may be more 
likely chosen as the vehicle to interact with outside industries.    
 My first set of tests focus on whether or not acquirers select targets to relieve 
restrictions to knowledge flow.  Columns (A) through (C) of Table XX present results of 
a binary probit model in which the dependent variable takes the value of ‘1’ if the firm is 
a target firm in a merger and acquisition and ‘0’ if the firm is a matched firm from 
COMPUSTAT found in the primary pool sample.  Results indicate that while acquirers 
do seek out high R&D firms, they do not seem to select firms to reduce the restrictions in 
knowledge flow between them.  These results may seem contradictory at first, but it 
seems to indicate that acquirers seem to target firms to purchase products that have been 
in development at the target firm rather than to gain access to the knowledge embedded 
in the target firm.  This is further backed up by evidence which suggests that acquirers 
are targeting firms with fewer growth opportunities as indicated by Tobin’s Q. 
 Lastly, I estimate the likelihood a firm will be a target firm versus an acquirer.  
There is no clear indication of how restrictions to knowledge flow should relate to a 
choice between firm types.  On one hand, univariate differences have shown that acquirer 
firms already have a larger degree of impedance to knowledge flow than target firms.  On 
the other hand, acquirer firms may be seeking out firms to alleviate restrictions to 
knowledge flow.  I estimate a binary probit model in Columns (D) –  (F) in Table XX to 
estimate the likelihood of being a target firm versus an acquirer firm with the dependent 
variable taking the value of ‘1’ for Target and ‘0’ for Acquirer.  I show that once size and 
R&D intensity are controlled for, higher levels of knowledge flow restriction indicate a 
higher likelihood of being a target firm versus an acquiring firm.  The results seem to 
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indicate that while acquirers do not seem to target a firm specifically to alleviate 
restrictions to knowledge flow, the acquiring firm is integrating with firms with more 
restrictions than itself. 
7.5 Announcement Date Effects 
 Does the market react when a deal is announced for partnerships and 
mergers/acquisitions based on restrictions to knowledge flow between firms?  If firms 
form partnerships and mergers/acquisitions for synergistic gains, then significant 
restrictions to knowledge flow should also represent a greater potential to realize these 
gains.  To clarify the announcement date effects, I first identify the announcement date 
using various press sources.  Since SDC’s announcement dates can be unreliable 
(Villalonga and McGahan, 2005), I search Lexis-Nexis as well as online corporate press 
releases to identify the dates.  However, because announcement dates can vary 
significantly even among press sources, I set the window around the announcement date 
to three different time periods, t-1/t+1 days, t-2/t+2 days, and t-5/t+5 days where t=0 is 
the identified announcement date.  Using the CRSP value-weighted returns for the market 
return
19
, I show the market adjusted returns for partnering firms and acquiring firms over 
these periods in Table XXI. 
 In Table XXII Columns (A) – (C) I use an OLS model to show that firms forming 
partnerships have a positive abnormal return around their announcement date when their 
partnering firm has knowledge assets that are difficult to access.  Results are weakest 
using the t-1/t+1 window and get stronger as the window expands.  This suggests that the 
market may not assimilate the information of the deal announcement into the price 
                                                 
19
 In untabulated results, I also used the CRSP equally-weighted index for the market return and found 
similar results. 
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immediately, which is not surprising given the uncertainty found in the press as to the 
actual announcement date of the deal.  In Columns (D) – (F), I use the same OLS model 
to show that these results do not hold for mergers/acquisitions.  Overall, my results 
support the idea that partnerships often act as a vehicle to augment access to another 
firms’ knowledge assets.  Firms with knowledge assets that are difficult to access are 
more likely to be involved in the formation of an integrative boundary which increases 
access to the partnering firm which leads to an increase in cross-citations between firms.  
When integration also includes the transfer of ownership, as is a merger/acquisition, the 
benefits of integration seem to be greatly reduced. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I examine 3,119 partnership announcements and 1,349 
merger/acquisition announcements between 1986 and 2005 to study how knowledge flow 
can affect the firms’ boundary decision.  By employing a dataset composed of SDC 
strategic alliances, joint ventures, and mergers/acquisitions, I am able to merge data from 
NBER’s USPTO patent citation database to measure the knowledge flow of alliance 
firms before and after the deal.  My empirical evidence supports the idea that knowledge 
assets act as a key determinant in the corporate decision to expand the boundary of the 
firm and that the degree to which firms expand their boundary is positively related to the 
degree of restriction to knowledge flow of a firm. These results hold true over various 
definitions of restriction to knowledge flow including 1) the frequency in which firms can 
access knowledge assets and 2) the speed at which knowledge assets can be accessed.  
Empirical evidence also suggests that the level of impedance to the firm affects the level 
at which firms will cross-cite each other after a partnership has taken place.   
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Additional research is needed in this area.  This paper recognizes the differences 
in the comparison between partnerships and mergers/acquisitions, but what remains is to 
reconcile the role of knowledge assets between these two distinct deal structures.  
Additionally, I have yet to explore the directional relation between knowledge flow and 
boundary choice.  Currently, my measure for cross-citations remains agnostic as to which 
firm cites whom.  In reality, the direction of knowledge flow might at times be 
unidirectional instead of the implied two-way flow in this study.  Lastly, this paper only 
looks at one channel through which knowledge may be transferred: patents.  In reality, 
patents are just one of many forms a knowledge asset may take.  Therefore, these results 
may actually understate the role that knowledge assets have on the boundary formation 
decision, especially in industries where patent use is low and other mechanisms are used.  
Though firms using patents are currently concentrated in certain industries, the role of 
knowledge assets is only set to expand as economies become more knowledge intensive.  
This paper hopes to illustrate how firms may make strategic corporate decisions now, and 
in the future. 
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Appendix A 
Definition of main variables 
 
Variable 
Name 
Description Definition Source* 
    
Structure Alliance type formed by firm-pair (broad definition) =0 if no alliance; =1 if strategic alliance; =2 if joint venture SDC 
    
Structure2 Alliance type formed by firm-pair (detailed definition) =0 if no alliance, =1 if licensing agreement, =2 if marketing 
agreement; =3 if manufacturing, R&D or technology agreement; =4 if 
joint venture 
SDC 
    
Boundary Partnership versus independent firms =0 if no alliance, =1 if either strategic alliance or joint venture SDC 
    
Target Target firm versus non-target firm in a 
merger/acquisition 
=1 if Target, =0 if other SDC 
    
JVSA Strategic Alliance/Joint Venture identifier =1 if the alliance is a joint venture and 0 if a strategic alliance SDC 
    
% 
CrossCitation 
Percentage of a firm-pairs citations which are cross 
cited within the prior two years  
∑                   
    
    
∑                   
    
    
 
USPTO 
    
RESTRICT1 % of all citations from firm j’s patents that are self-
cited by firm j  
∑                  
    
    
∑                   
    
    
 
USPTO 
    
RESTRICT2 % of firm j’s citations from all firms that are self-cited 
 
∑                  
    
    
∑                    
    
    
 
USPTO 
    
YTC The average of the minimum time until a patent is 
cited in years =
∑                                      
   
   
 
 
USPTO 
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Appendix A - Continued 
 
Variable 
Name 
Description Definition Source* 
    
Patent Dummy if firm has ever used a patent throughout the 
sample period 
=1 if a firm has used a patent; =0 otherwise USPTO 
    
Hor Degree of horizontal relatedness between firms in a 
firm-pair 
=4 if pair has same 4-digit SIC; =3 if pair has same 3-digit SIC; =2 if 
pair has same 2-digit SIC; =1 if pair has same 1-digit SIC; =0 
otherwise 
SDC/ 
Compustat 
    
VRC Dummy for vertical relatedness between firms in a 
firm-pair 
See paper for full description BEA 
    
Assets Size of firm Assets of firm ($mil) Compustat 
    
Q Tobin’s Q measure of firm’s growth potential 
 
                                                  
      
 
Compustat 
    
R&D R&D expenditures as a % of firm assets  
 
          
             
 
Compustat 
    
ROA Return on Assets (%) 
 
             
             
 
Compustat 
    
Segments Number of business segments in a firm =Number of Business Segments Compustat 
Segment 
Tape 
    
MRet (1,2 &5) Market-adjusted return over 1,2 and 5 day windows 
around the announcement date using the CRSP value-
weighted index as the market return. 
=Percent Change in market adjusted price CRSP 
    
*Sources are described in the text: USPTO = United States Patent and Trademark Office database of United States patents; SDC = The Securities Data Corporation’s Strategic Alliance and Joint Venture 
Database or Mergers/Acquisition Database; BEA = the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Input-Output Industry tables; Compustat = Standard and Poors’ Compustat database of financial and 
operating data.  CRSP = The Center for Research in Securities Prices.  
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Appendix B 
Description of matched sample creation 
Below is a graphical representation of the creation of the Secondary Pooled Sample using a simple 
framework.  The original firm pair found in the SDC sample is Firm A and B. Firm A is in industry 1000 
while firm B is in industry 3000.  To identify a counterfactual firm to Firm B, I identify any firm-pair 
where a firm is in the same industry as Firm B.  In the example below, three firms are identified, Firm D, 
Firm E and Firm H.  Of the three firms, I identify whether to partnering firm is in the same industry as Firm 
A.  Only one firm-pair matches this criterion.  Firm H is in the same industry as Firm B and Firm G is in 
the same industry as Firm A.  Thus Firm H is selected as the counterfactual to Firm B.  The firm-pair of 
Firm A and Firm H would enter into the sample an identified as forming no alliance.  
 
 
ORIGINAL FIRM-PAIR MATCH BY FIRM B SIC MATCHED FIRM 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
FIRM A 
SIC 1000 
 
FIRM B 
SIC 3000 
 
FIRM I 
SIC 1000 
 
FIRM J 
SIC 5000 
 
FIRM G 
SIC 1000 
 
FIRM H 
SIC 3000 
 
FIRM E 
SIC 3000 
 
FIRM F 
SIC 4000 
 
FIRM C 
SIC 2000 
FIRM D 
SIC 3000 
 
FIRM H 
SIC 3000 
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Appendix C 
Knowledge Asset Inaccessibility Measure Example Calculations 
Below is an example of the calculations to measure patent inaccessibility via patent self-citations.  Panel A 
lists the patent numbers, year of patent application and the firm creating the patent.  In addition, Panel A 
lists the citations attached to the patent including the year the cited patent was applied for and the owner of 
the patent.  Panel B uses the information provided in Panel A to create the RESTRICT1 calculation for Firm 
A as of the year 2001.  Panel C uses the information provided in Panel A to create the RESTRICT2 
calculation for Firm A as of the year 2001. 
 
Panel A: List of Patents Used in Example 
Patent # Application 
Year 
Patent Owner Patent # Cited Application 
Year of Cited 
Owner of 
Cited Patent 
1000 2000 Firm A 900 1998 Firm A 
   700 1992 Firm A 
   850 1997 Firm B 
900 1998 Firm A 700 1992 Firm A 
   850 1997 Firm B 
   450 1990 Firm B 
950 1999 Firm B 700 1992 Firm A 
850 1997 Firm B 700 1992 Firm A 
700 1992 Firm A N/A   
450 1990 Firm B N/A   
      
Panel B: Calculation of Percentage Self-Citations for RESTRICT1 for year 2001 
Firm A’s 
Patents 
Application 
Year 
 Patent # Cited Owner of Cited 
Patent 
Self-Citation 
1000 2000  900 Firm A Yes 
   700 Firm A Yes 
   850 Firm B No 
900 1998  700 Firm A Yes 
   850 Firm B No 
   450 Firm B No 
    % Self-
Citations 
=3/6 or .5 
      
Panel C: Calculation of Percentage Self-Citations for RESTRICT2 for year 2001 
Patent Citing 
Firm A 
Application 
Year of Patent 
Firm Citing Patent # Cited  Self-Citation 
1000 2000 Firm A 900  Yes 
1000 2000 Firm A 700  Yes 
900 1998 Firm A 700  Yes 
950 1999 Firm B 700  No 
850 1997 Firm B 700  No 
    % Self-
Citations 
=3/5 or .6 
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Table I 
Descriptive Statistics of Patents granted by the USPTO from 1976 to 2006 
The table presents frequency data and descriptive statistics of patent data from the NBER database of 
United States patents from 1976 to 2006 that have been both applied for and subsequently granted by the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  Panel A presents frequency data of patent usage.  # 
of firms Applied for patents presents the number of firms in a given year who have applied for a patent by 
the USPTO who would subsequently be granted.  # Patents Applied presents the total number of patents 
applied for to the USPTO in a given year that would subsequently be granted.  # Patents Granted presents 
the number of patents granted by the USPTO during a given year.  # of Patent Citations of Applied presents 
the total number of citations included on all patents applied for and subsequently granted in a given year.  % 
Self-Citations represents the percentage of all citations in a given year that were cited by their own firm for 
all patents applied for.  Cumulative % Self-Citations represents the percentage of all citations from 1976 to 
the given year, that were cited by their own firm.  Panel B presents data on the usage and workings of 
United States patents.  Patents Held by Firm presents firm-year univariate statistics on the number of 
patents owned by a firm for a given year where the firm holds at least one patent.  Review presents the 
length of time between application date and date granted of United States patents.  Citations per Patent 
presents the number of citations attached to a patent.  YTC presents the minimum time to first citation of a 
patent.  Panel C presents a citation level analysis of how quickly patents are cited by other firms. 
 
Panel A: Patent Frequency and Usage by Year 
Year # Firms 
Applied for 
Patent  
# Patents 
Applied 
# Patents 
Granted 
# of Patent 
Citations of 
Applied 
% Self-
Citations 
Cumulative % 
Self-Citations 
1976 1,470 65,813 1,062 34,066 11.30% 11.30% 
1977 1,372 65,998 28,499 61,589 10.69% 10.91% 
1978 1,389 65,610 59,033 89,934 9.51% 10.23% 
1979 1,318 65,728 47,393 115,073 9.70% 10.03% 
1980 1,367 66,505 60,759 140,272 9.28% 9.79% 
1981 1,364 63,936 65,390 159,744 8.90% 9.55% 
1982 1,371 65,038 57,640 182,495 8.72% 9.36% 
1983 1,437 61,585 56,743 192,290 7.74% 9.04% 
1984 1,490 67,096 67,147 227,226 7.74% 8.79% 
1985 1,599 71,484 71,629 262,375 7.52% 8.57% 
1986 1,692 75,122 70,837 305,429 6.89% 8.28% 
1987 1,784 81,520 82,917 361,001 6.77% 8.02% 
1988 1,805 90,218 77,919 429,247 6.89% 7.83% 
1989 1,717 96,188 95,574 482,914 6.92% 7.69% 
1990 1,748 99,412 90,355 535,928 6.87% 7.56% 
1991 1,843 100,298 96,496 583,216 6.79% 7.46% 
1992 1,915 103,949 97,458 671,681 6.63% 7.34% 
1993 2,074 108,342 98,357 777,087 6.55% 7.23% 
1994 2,242 123,325 101,671 949,798 6.73% 7.16% 
1995 2,577 144,523 101,411 1,291,533 6.66% 7.08% 
1996 2,597 144,792 109,633 1,291,991 6.59% 7.01% 
1997 2,794 169,360 112,009 1,647,305 6.49% 6.93% 
1998 2,963 167,826 147,571 1,689,253 6.49% 6.87% 
1999 3,059 178,560 153,581 1,926,657 6.35% 6.80% 
2000 2,989 189,530 157,580 2,217,668 6.31% 6.73% 
2001 2,838 191,722 166,053 2,305,183 6.27% 6.68% 
2002 2,501 169,599 167,411 2,130,570 6.48% 6.66% 
2003 1,960 119,770 169,114 1,519,454 6.57% 6.65% 
2004 1,339 62,396 164,401 799,178 6.98% 6.66% 
2005 698 17,177 143,924 224,103 7.10% 6.67% 
2006 127 1,039 173,921 13,630 5.02% 6.67% 
Total 57,439 3,093,461 3,093,461 23,617,890 6.67% 6.67% 
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Table I – Continued 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of NBER USPTO Patent database from 1976 – 2006  
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Patents Held by Firm 96,132 191.84 10.000 1,227.08 1.000 46,037 
Review 3,093,461 2.137 2.000 1.138 0.000 28.00 
Citations per Patent 3,093,461 7.635 4.000 14.147 0.000 785.00 
YTC 2,407,511 2.994 2.000 3.209 -89.00 29.00 
 
 
Panel C: Frequency of Years to Citation of all citations of NBER USPTO Patent data, 1976 – 2006  
Years to citation of patent citation    Frequency  % of Total 
<0 yrs.    57,832  0.25% 
0    340,495  1.46% 
1    1,199,485  5.15% 
2    1,982,240  8.52% 
3    2,282,014  9.81% 
4    2,258,721  9.71% 
5    2,063,062  8.87% 
6    1,814,588  7.80% 
7    1,566,470  6.73% 
8    1,342,734  5.77% 
9    1,151,127  4.95% 
10     989,899  4.25% 
>10 yrs.    5,537,341  23.79% 
Un-cited    685,950  2.95% 
Total    23,271,958  100.00% 
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Table II 
Frequency Data of Firm Boundary Choice 
The table presents the frequency of boundary changes by alliance type by year from 1986 to 2005 as found 
in SDC’s Strategic Alliance and Joint Venture database.  Panel A examines broad boundary definitions 
while Panel B breaks down the frequency of strategic alliances only.  Observations are defined at the firm-
pair level with each observation being a single deal.  
 
Panel A: Frequency of boundary changes by year – broad boundary definition 
Year Boundary Changes Strategic Alliances Joint Ventures % of Total 
1986 13 2 11 0.42% 
1987 14 7 7 0.45% 
1988 23 6 17 0.74% 
1989 35 21 14 1.12% 
1990 117 81 36 3.75% 
1991 230 172 58 7.37% 
1992 258 232 26 8.27% 
1993 237 203 34 7.60% 
1994 272 226 46 8.72% 
1995 295 234 61 9.46% 
1996 229 188 41 7.34% 
1997 335 261 74 10.74% 
1998 243 204 39 7.79% 
1999 284 253 31 9.11% 
2000 167 133 34 5.35% 
2001 94 86 8 3.01% 
2002 58 52 6 1.86% 
2003 73 68 5 2.34% 
2004 63 56 7 2.02% 
2005 79 78 1 2.53% 
Total 3,119 2,563 556 100.00% 
 
Panel B: Frequency of Strategic Alliances, 1986 – 2005 
Year Strategic 
Alliances 
Licensing 
Agreements 
Marketing 
Agreements 
Tech., R&D 
or Manufact. 
Un-identified % of Total 
1986 2 0 0 2 0 0.08% 
1987 7 0 0 6 1 0.27% 
1988 6 0 1 4 1 0.23% 
1989 21 0 0 16 5 0.82% 
1990 81 2 20 41 18 3.16% 
1991 172 0 51 90 31 6.71% 
1992 232 0 74 128 30 9.05% 
1993 203 1 54 129 19 7.92% 
1994 226 0 48 164 14 8.82% 
1995 234 0 35 173 26 9.13% 
1996 188 0 26 123 39 7.34% 
1997 261 3 30 152 76 10.18% 
1998 204 7 31 59 107 7.96% 
1999 253 4 33 69 147 9.87% 
2000 133 2 23 18 90 5.19% 
2001 86 0 16 18 52 3.36% 
2002 52 0 11 11 30 2.03% 
2003 68 1 13 19 35 2.65% 
2004 56 1 11 12 32 2.18% 
2005 78 1 10 35 32 3.04% 
Total 2,563 22 487 1,269 785 100.00% 
63 
 
Table III 
Distribution of Firm-Level Boundary Choice and Patent Use by Two-Digit SIC over Sample Period 
This table provides the distribution of boundary choice and Patent Use by the two-digit SIC code over the 1986 to 2005 sample period.  Boundary choice is determined if 
a pair of partnering firms decide to enter into either a strategic alliance or joint venture.  For each boundary decision, two SIC codes are used, one from each participating 
firm.  Patents is the number of patents granted by the United States Patents and Trademark Office to sample firms through 2006.  % Using Patents is the percentage of 
unique sample firms granted at least one patent through 2006. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of boundary choices by industry sorted by Patent usage (Industries with ten or more unique firms in sample) 
Two Digit 
SIC Industry Description 
Sample Firm 
Years 
Unique 
Firms 
Strategic 
Alliances 
Joint  
Ventures 
 
Patents 
% Using 
Patents 
38 Instruments & Related Products 350 142 310 40 127,004 92.25% 
37 Transportation Equipment 166 45 107 59 61,152 91.11% 
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 693 193 601 92 221,816 90.16% 
35 Industry Machinery & Equipment 893 162 829 64 107,236 90.12% 
26 Paper & Allied Products 32 20 13 19 9,772 90.00% 
30 Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Products 15 10 11 4 5,336 90.00% 
31 Leather & Leather Products 11 10 10 1 1,652 90.00% 
28 Chemical & Allied Products 759 250 628 131 129,008 88.00% 
20 Food and Kindred Products 56 22 34 22 5,385 86.36% 
23 Apparel and Other Finished Products 33 18 32 1 190 83.33% 
33 Primary Metal Industries 17 11 10 7 3,397 81.82% 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 17 10 10 7 2,857 80.00% 
39 Misc. Manufacturing Industries 35 14 27 8 6,212 78.57% 
87 Engineering & Management Services 125 68 100 25 2,296 70.59% 
73 Business Services 1,734 406 1,618 116 88,973 64.29% 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 30 16 27 3 86 56.25% 
13 Oil & Gas Extraction 125 50 41 84 2,399 50.00% 
27 Printing & Publishing 78 24 52 26 330 45.83% 
51 Wholesale Trade – Nondurable Goods 24 18 19 5 229 42.86% 
10 Metal Mining 28 14 3 25 153 40.00% 
49 Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services 152 67 60 92 8,557 38.81% 
78 Motion Pictures 60 19 37 23 321 36.84% 
79 Amusement & Recreation Services 42 15 25 17 171 33.33% 
80 Health Services 44 27 33 11 148 33.33% 
48 Communications 322 87 229 93 27,027 32.18% 
50 Wholesale Trade – Durable Goods 91 45 84 7 38,322 31.11% 
58 Eating & Drinking Places 24 14 10 14 125 28.57% 
70 Hotels & Other Lodging Places 19 14 9 10 3,788 28.57% 
64 
 
57 Furniture & Home Furnishings Stores 20 10 17 3 83 20.00% 
45 Transportation by Air 32 10 28 4 9 20.00% 
 
Panel B: Distribution of boundary choices by industry sorted by Two-digit SIC code (Industries with less than ten unique firms in sample) 
Two Digit 
SIC Industry Description 
Sample Firm 
Years 
Unique 
Firms 
Strategic 
Alliances 
Joint  
Ventures 
 
Patents 
% Using 
Patents 
01 Agriculture Production – Crops  7 3 4 3 139 100.00% 
07 Agricultural Services 2 1 1 1 217 100.00% 
12 Coal Mining 6 5 2 4 5 40.00% 
15 Building Construction 10 8 2 8 71 37.50% 
16 Heavy Construction, Except Building 8 2 4 4 3 50.00% 
17 Special Trade Contractors 5 4 2 3 23 50.00% 
22 Textile Mills Products 5 5 3 2 257 100.00% 
24 Lumber & Wood Products, Except Furniture 8 5 4 4 711 80.00% 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 2 2 1 1 385 50.00% 
29 Petroleum & Coal Products 44 8 12 32 3,134 100.00% 
32 Stone, Clay, & Glass Products 19 3 13 6 8,732 100.00% 
40 Railroad Transportation 12 5 7 5 46 40.00% 
42 Trucking & Warehousing 11 4 10 1 184 25.00% 
43 U.S. Postal Service 1 1 1 0 40 100.00% 
44 Water Transportation 3 3 0 3 24 33.33% 
46 Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 2 1 0 2 3,729 100.00% 
47 Transportation Services 9 7 6 3 42 28.57% 
52 Building Materials & Gardening Supplies 4 3 4 0 1 33.33% 
53 General Merchandise Stores 15 6 11 4 106 50.00% 
54 Food Stores 12 7 8 4 31 57.14% 
55 Automotive Dealers & Service Stations 2 1 2 0 0 0.00% 
56 Apparel & Accessory Stores 5 4 4 1 1 25.00% 
72 Personal Services 2 2 0 2 0 0.00% 
75 Auto Repair, Services, & Parking 10 4 7 3 201 50.00% 
76 Miscellaneous Repair Services 1 1 1 0 10 100.00% 
81 Legal Services 1 1 1 0 0 0.00% 
82 Educational Services 3 2 1 2 2 100.00% 
83 Social Services 1 1 1 0 2 100.00% 
89 Services, Other 1 1 0 1 0 0.00% 
Total (Panel A & B) 6,238 1,908 5,126 1,112 872,810 69.48% 
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Table IV 
Descriptive Statistics of Firm-Level Data 
Table IV presents descriptive statistics of COMPUSTAT, SDC/Compustat merged, and matched firms to 
the SDC/Compustat datasets from years 1986 through 2005.  All data are at the firm level.  Panel A 
presents descriptive statistics from COMPUSTAT firms regardless if they enter the sample.  Panel B 
presents descriptive statistics of firms matched to SDC’s strategic alliance or joint venture firms based on 
conditional matching done by Industry, Year, and Size (Assets, $mil).  Panel C presents descriptive 
statistics of sample firms who enter into either a strategic alliance or joint venture during a given year.  
Panel D and E further breakdown these firms into those firms entering into a strategic alliance and those 
firms entering into a joint venture.  Firms with an SIC in the 6000’s are excluded from all panels.  Results 
shown are winsorized at the 2% level.   
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of COMPUSTAT firms 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
RESTRICT1 44,424 0.067 0.024 0.104 0.000 1.000 
RESTRICT2 50,008 0.073 0.016 0.124 0.000 1.000 
YTC 51,667 2.371 2.196 1.654 0.000 26.000 
Patent 167,197 0.393 0.000 0.488 0.000 1.000 
Size 167,197 1,020.41 77.069 2,829.12 0.291 15,779.00 
R&D 167,197 0.051 0.000 0.114 0.000 0.566 
Q 138,860 2.429 1.439 2.916 0.600 16.933 
ROA 164,917 -0.031 0.095 0.418 -2.028 0.355 
Segments 167,197 1.274 1.000 0.756 1.000 10.000 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of COMPUSTAT Matched Firms 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
RESTRICT1 3,428 0.072 0.041 0.096 0.000 1.000 
RESTRICT2 3,583 0.079 0.049 0.104 0.000 1.000 
YTC 3,554 2.020 1.778 1.330 0.000 15.000 
Patent 6,256 0.678 1.000 0.467 0.000 1.000 
Size 6,256 3,406.01 1,005.62 4,918.92 0.291 15,779.00 
R&D 6,256 0.071 0.036 0.095 0.000 0.566 
Q 5,530 2.532 1.702 2.469 0.600 16.933 
ROA 6,125 0.101 0.126 0.207 -2.028 0.355 
Segments 6,256 1.159 1.000 0.614 1.000 7.000 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of firms entering into a strategic alliance or joint venture 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
RESTRICT1 4,718 0.092 0.061 0.096 0.000 1.000 
RESTRICT2 4,852 0.097 0.071 0.103 0.000 1.000 
YTC 4,869 2.010 1.980 1.150 0.000 10.000 
Patent 6,238 0.846 1.000 0.361 0.000 1.000 
Size 6,238 5,366.72 1,752.17 6,326.18 0.291 15,779.00 
R&D 6,238 0.091 0.067 0.104 0.000 0.566 
Q 6,129 3.103 1.947 3.050 0.600 16.933 
ROA 6,202 0.093 0.134 0.222 -2.028 0.355 
Segments 6,238 1.302 1.000 0.913 1.000 10.000 
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Table IV – Continued 
 
 
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics of firms entering into a strategic alliance 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
RESTRICT1 4,044 0.088 0.057 0.094 0.000 1.000 
RESTERIC2 4,148 0.096 0.067 0.103 0.000 1.000 
YTC 4,170 1.896 1.795 1.108 0.000 10.000 
Patent 5,126 0.869 1.000 0.337 0.000 1.000 
Size 5,126 5,060.93 1,414.49 6,229.98 0.291 15,779.00 
R&D 5,126 0.103 0.083 0.106 0.000 0.566 
Q 5,040 3.302 2.112 3.175 0.600 16.933 
ROA 5,097 0.089 0.136 0.232 -2.028 0.355 
Segments 5,126 1.224 1.000 0.782 1.000 9.000 
 
Panel E: Descriptive Statistics of firms entering into a joint venture 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
RESTRICT1 674 0.116 0.088 0.106 0.000 0.512 
RESTRICT2 320 0.100 0.076 0.102 0.000 0.589 
YTC 532 2.756 2.909 1.167 0.000 8.000 
Patent 1,112 0.737 1.000 0.440 0.000 1.000 
Size 1,112 6,776.34 4,115.05 6,573.33 0.516 15,779.00 
R&D 1,112 0.039 0.006 0.071 0.000 0.566 
Q 1,089 2.181 1.508 2.155 0.600 16.933 
ROA 1,105 0.109 0.126 0.170 -2.028 0.355 
Segments 1,112 1.663 1.000 1.303 1.000 10.000 
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Table V 
Correlation Matrix of Main Variables 
Table V presents univariate Pearson pair-wise correlation coefficients of the NBER/Compustat/SDC merged sample between 1986 and 2005.  All observations 
are at the firm level.  Variable descriptions can be found in Appendix A.  Due to RESTRICT1, RESTRICT2, and YTC requiring patents to create the respective 
variables, correlations between these variables and Patent Usage are not applicable.  Variables are winsorized at the 2% level. 
 
 
Variable Structure RESTRICT1 RESTRICT2 YTC Patent Size R&D Q ROA 
Structure          
RESTRICT1 0.091         
RESTRICT2 0.064 0.739        
YTC 0.069 0.428 0.145       
Patent 0.090 N/A N/A N/A      
Size 0.125 0.418 0.287 0.259 0.198     
R&D -0.003 -0.132 0.002 -0.327 0.229 -0.247    
Q 0.007 -0.134 -0.060 -0.335 0.111 -0.124 0.251   
ROA 0.002 0.022 -0.024 0.076 0.117 0.213 -0.423 -0.061  
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Table VI 
Univariate Subset Analysis of Main Variables at Firm Level 
Table VI presents descriptive statistics of the main firm-level variables of the paper broken down into various sub-samples.  The sample is composed of 
COMPUSTAT/SDC merged samples of strategic alliances and joint ventures from 1986 through 2005 as well as conditionally matched firms.  Panel A presents 
descriptive statistics of sample firms that engaged in either a strategic alliance or joint venture and was granted a patent by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) at any time between 1976 and 2006.  Panel B presents descriptive statistics of firms that engaged in either a strategic alliance or joint 
venture and was never granted a patent between 1976 and 2006.  Panel C presents descriptive statistics of conditionally matched firms from COMPUSTAT, 
matched by Year, Industry and Size (assets, $mil) that were granted a patent by the USPTO from 1976 and 2006.  Panel D presents conditionally matched firms 
that were not granted a patent between 1976 and 2006.  Variable definitions can be references in Appendix A.  Variables are winsorized at 2%. 
 
Panel A: Firms with boundary change and use patents  Panel B: Firms with boundary change and do not use patents 
Variable Obs Mean Med. Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max  Obs Mean Med. Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
RESTRICT1 4,718 0.092 0.061 0.096 0.000 1.000        
RESTRICT2 4,852 0.097 0.071 0.103 0.000 1.000        
YTC 4,869 2.010 1.981 1.150 0.000 10.000  
Size 5,276 5,815.00 2,206.62 6,465.89 0.291 15,779.00  962 2,908.16 465.65 4,806.09 0.291 15,779.00 
R&D 5,276 0.101 0.080 0.103 0.000 0.566  962 0.038 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.566 
Q 5,198 3.222 2.057 3.090 0.600 16.933  931 2.440 1.545 2.719 0.600 16.933 
ROA 5,245 0.102 0.144 0.214 -2.028 0.355  957 0.040 0.106 0.258 -2.028 0.355 
Segments 5,276 1.320 1.000 0.948 1.000 10.000  962 1.206 1.000 0.676 1.000 6.000 
              
Panel C: Firms without boundary change and use patents  Panel D: Firms without boundary change and do not use patents 
Variable Obs Mean Med. Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max  Obs Mean Med. Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
RESTRICT1 3,428 0.072 0.041 0.096 0.000 1.000        
RESTRICT2 3,583 0.079 0.049 0.104 0.000 1.000        
YTC 3,554 2.020 1.778 1.330 0.000 15.000        
Size 4,242 4,063.21 1,454.85 5,268.13 0.424 15,779.00  2,014 2,021.78 436.20 3,726.36 0.291 15,779.00 
R&D 4,242 0.087 0.059 0.093 0.000 0.566  2,014 0.038 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.566 
Q 3,904 2.707 1.858 2.608 0.600 16.933  1,626 2.111 1.433 2.041 0.600 16.933 
ROA 4,236 0.117 0.140 0.198 -2.028 0.355  1,889 0.063 0.104 0.222 -2.028 0.355 
Segments 4,242 1.182 1.000 0.656 1.000 7.000  2,014 1.111 1.000 0.510 1.000 7.000 
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Table VII 
Univariate Analysis of Differences in Main Variables at Firm Level 
This table reports the differences in univariate statistics among different data sub-samples.  The sample is composed of COMPUSTAT/SDC merged observations 
of strategic alliances and joint ventures, along with matching COMPUSTAT firms, from 1986 through 2005.  The sub-samples are determined by ‘Patent Usage’ 
for which a firm is designated ‘Yes’ if the firm has been granted a patent by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) at any time from 1976 and 
2006 and 'No' otherwise.  Sub-samples are also determined by if the firm engaged in a boundary change as indicated by entering the SDC strategic alliance and 
joint venture dataset.  ‘Yes’ indicated firms who have entered into either a strategic alliance or joint ventures and ‘No’ indicates matched COMPUSTAT firms 
not entering into a strategic alliance or joint venture.  Variables definitions can be referenced in Appendix A.  Variables are winsorized at 2%.  ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
 
Variable Patent Usage=Yes 
vs. No 
Boundary 
Change=Yes 
Patent Usage=Yes 
vs. No 
Boundary 
Change=No 
Patent Usage=Yes 
 
Boundary 
Change=Yes vs. No 
Patent Usage=No 
 
Boundary 
Change=Yes vs. No 
Boundary 
Change=Yes vs. No 
Patent Usage=Yes 
vs. No 
       
RESTRICT1   0.020***  0.020***  
   (9.28)  (9.28)  
       
RESTRICT2   0.018***  0.018***  
   (7.89)  (7.89)  
       
YTC   -0.010  -0.010  
   (0.36)  (0.36)  
       
Size 2,906.84*** 2,041.43*** 1,751.79*** 886.38*** 1,960.71*** 2,725.96*** 
 (16.27) (17.61) (14.56) (5.04) (19.34) (27.92) 
       
R&D 0.063*** 0.049*** 0.014*** 0.000 0.020*** 0.057*** 
 (18.99) (19.90) (6.96) (0.00) (11.22) (29.19) 
       
Q 0.782*** 0.596*** 0.515*** 0.329*** 0.571*** 0.770*** 
 (7.91) (9.08) (8.61) (3.21) (11.16) (14.00) 
       
ROA -0.004 0.054*** -0.015*** 0.043*** -0.008** 0.053*** 
 (0.45) (9.08) (3.54) (4.40) (2.07) (10.84) 
       
Segments 0.114*** 0.071*** 0.138*** 0.095*** 0.143*** 0.116*** 
 (4.49) (4.68) (8.37) (3.86) (10.27) (8.59) 
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Table VIII 
The Propensity to Form Strategic Alliances/Joint Ventures 
This table reports the probability of entering into either a strategic alliance or joint venture in a multivariate 
framework.  The sample is composed of SDC/COMPUSTAT merged observations of strategic alliances 
and joint ventures, with matching observations from COMPUSTAT, from 1986 through 2005.  Columns (A) 
through (C) are binary probit models with the dependent variable defined as the choice to enter a strategic 
alliance or joint venture (dependent variable set to ‘1’) or not (dependent variable set to ‘0’).  Columns (D) 
through (F) model the choice to enter a strategic alliance or joint venture using a linear probability model 
with fixed effects.  Industry fixed effects are at the 2-digit SIC level.  Variables definitions can be 
referenced in Appendix A.  Variables are winsorized at 2%.  Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit SIC 
code.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
 
 
 Boundary Boundary Boundary Boundary Boundary Boundary 
Variable (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
RESTRICT1 1.226***   0.534***   
 (7.70)   (8.54)   
       
RESTRICT2  0.830***   0.383***  
  (5.86)   (6.82)  
       
YTC   0.033***   0.008* 
   (2.61)   (1.93) 
       
Log(Size) 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 
 (4.56) (4.88) (5.45) (4.42) (4.85) (5.84) 
       
R&D 1.171*** 1.141*** 1.237*** 0.419*** 0.429*** 0.443*** 
 (6.33) (6.30) (6.69) (5.89) (6.10) (6.22) 
       
Q 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 
 (9.35) (8.95) (9.43) (7.56) (7.47) (8.29) 
       
ROA -0.373*** -0.322*** -0.326*** -0.146*** -0.122*** -0.136*** 
 (3.95) (3.53) (3.58) (3.99) (3.43) (3.82) 
       
Log(Segments) 0.270*** 0.274*** 0.266*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 0.076*** 
 (6.67) (6.94) (6.67) (5.12) (5.29) (4.95) 
       
Intercept -0.430*** -0.407*** -0.436*** 0.665*** 0.712*** 0.466*** 
 (6.06) (5.98) (5.91) (3.61) (3.85) (9.33) 
       
Industry F.E. No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Pseudo    /    0.023 0.023 0.020 0.043 0.038 0.033 
       
Obs 7,902 8,168 8,157 7,902 8,168 8,157 
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Table IX 
The Propensity to Form Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures 
This table reports the probability of entering into strategic alliances or joint ventures in a multivariate 
framework.  The sample is composed of SDC/COMPUSTAT merged observations of strategic alliances 
and joint ventures, with matching observations from COMPUSTAT, from 1986 through 2005.  All models 
employ a binary probit regression.  Columns (A) through (C) use the sub-sample of firms that choice to 
enter a strategic alliance and their subsequent COMPUSTAT matched firms.  Columns (D) through (F) use 
the sub-sample of joint ventures and their subsequent COMPUSTAT matched firms.  The dependent 
variable is set to ‘0’ if the firm did not enter a strategic alliance or joint venture and ‘1’ if they did.  
Variables definitions can be referenced in Appendix A.  Variables are winsorized at 2%.  Standard errors 
are clustered at the 2-digit SIC code.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively.   
 
 
 Boundary Boundary Boundary Boundary Boundary Boundary 
Variable (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
RESTRICT1 1.256***   1.236***   
 (7.04)   (3.57)   
       
RESTRICT2  0.748***   1.129***  
  (4.91)   (3.24)  
       
YTC   0.020*   0.096*** 
   (1.87)   (3.13) 
       
Log(Size) 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.111*** 
 (3.52) (3.94) (4.22) (4.51) (4.68) (5.02) 
       
R&D 1.252*** 1.204*** 1.242*** 0.558 0.603 1.002* 
 (6.38) (6.28) (6.40) (0.94) (1.02) (1.69) 
       
Q 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.051*** 0.033* 0.028 0.042** 
 (8.98) (8.60) (8.91) (1.76) (1.52) (2.22) 
       
ROA -0.319*** -0.298*** -0.293*** -0.972*** -0.682** -0.669** 
 (3.20) (3.11) (3.05) (3.37) (2.39) (2.38) 
       
Log(Segments) 0.303*** 0.303*** 0.299*** 0.234*** 0.241*** 0.224*** 
 (6.03) (6.20) (6.02) (3.30) (3.49) (3.22) 
       
Intercept -0.406*** -0.378*** -0.374*** -0.871*** -0.894*** -1.118*** 
 (5.36) (5.23) (4.94) (4.50) (4.73) (5.51) 
       
Industry F.E. No No No No No No 
Year F.E. No No No No No No 
       
Pseudo    0.027 0.026 0.020 0.041 0.035 0.034 
       
Obs 6,814 7,019 7,021 1,187 1,250 1,242 
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Table X 
Ordered Analysis on the Formation of Strategic Alliances/Joint Ventures 
This table reports the probability of entering into strategic alliances or joint ventures in a multivariate 
framework.  The sample is composed of SDC/COMPUSTAT merged observations of strategic alliances 
and joint ventures, with matching observations from COMPUSTAT, from 1986 through 2005.  All models 
employ a probit regression.  Columns (A) through (C) utilize a binary probit regression; setting the 
dependent variable to ‘1’ for if a firm and enters into a joint venture and ‘0’ for a strategic alliance.  
Columns (D) through (F) utilize an ordered probit regression; setting the dependent variable to ‘0’ for no 
alliance, ‘1’ for strategic alliance and ‘2’ for joint venture.  Variables definitions can be referenced in 
Appendix A.  Variables are winsorized at 2%.  Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit SIC code.  ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
 
 
 JVSA JVSA JVSA Structure Structure Structure 
Variable (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
RESTRICT1 0.769***   1.242***   
 (2.99)   (8.83)   
       
RESTRICT2  0.780***   0.768***  
  (4.00)   (6.09)  
       
YTC   0.217***   0.088*** 
   (9.70)   (7.68) 
       
Log(Size) 0.047*** 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 
 (3.10) (3.81) (3.57) (6.38) (7.24) (7.58) 
       
R&D -4.062*** -4.381*** -3.168*** 0.038 0.037 0.338** 
 (11.20) (11.72) (8.69) (0.024) (0.23) (2.08) 
       
Q -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.006 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.035*** 
 (3.25) (3.38) (0.60) (5.99) (5.50) (7.41) 
       
ROA -0.824*** -0.711*** -0.717*** -0.461*** -0.412*** -0.381*** 
 (4.88) (4.11) (4.37) (5.70) (5.26) (4.87) 
       
Intercept -0.970*** -1.037*** -1.560*** 0.284*** 0.284*** 0.451*** 
 (7.92) (8.76) (12.08) (4.42) (4.62) (6.73) 
       
Intercept 2    1.913*** 1.892*** 2.075*** 
    (17.78) (29.34) (29.73) 
       
Industry F.E. No No No No No No 
Year F.E. No No No No No No 
       
Pseudo    0.079 0.082 0.100 0.014 0.010 0.011 
       
Obs 4,647 4,769 4,800 7,902 8,168 8,157 
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Table XI 
Selection Model for the Determinants of Forming Strategic Alliance verses Joint Venture 
This table reports the probability of entering into either a strategic alliance or joint venture in a multivariate 
framework once the decision has been made to form an alliance.  The sample is composed of 
SDC/COMPUSTAT merged observations of strategic alliances and joint ventures, with matching 
observations from COMPUSTAT, from 1986 through 2005.  The first stage selections predicting the 
probability of forming an alliance are from Columns (A) through (C) of Table VIII.  All models in this 
table use a linear probability model as the second stage.  Columns (D) through (F) use fixed-effects while 
Columns (A) through (C) do not.  Industry fixed effects are at the 2-digit SIC level.  Variables definitions 
can be referenced in Appendix A.  Variables are winsorized at 2% and standard errors are clustered at the 
2-digit SIC industry code.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
 
 
 JVSA JVSA JVSA JVSA JVSA JVSA 
Variable (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
RESTRICT1 0.118**   0.104*   
 (2.02)   (1.77)   
       
RESTRICT2  0.121***   0.108***  
  (2.85)   (2.60)  
       
YTC   0.052***   0.033*** 
   (10.77)   (6.47) 
       
Log(Size) 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 
 (2.79) (3.58) (2.76) (2.61) (4.12) (2.80) 
       
R&D -0.724*** -0.738*** -0.552*** -0.737*** -0.772*** -0.499*** 
 (11.54) (11.82) (8.82) (11.69) (12.50) (7.94) 
       
Q -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.003 -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.001 
 (4.87) (5.02) (1.60) (5.15) (4.12) (0.65) 
       
ROA -0.167*** -0.156*** -0.130*** -0.163*** -0.196*** -0.108*** 
 (5.41) (5.15) (4.37) (5.27) (6.38) (3.58) 
       
Inverse Mills -0.212*** -0.205*** -0.186*** -0.267*** -0.275*** -0.142** 
 (4.42) (4.33) (3.67) (5.95) (6.28) (2.25) 
       
Intercept 0.236*** 0.217*** 0.101*** 0.256*** 0.069* 0.026 
 (7.70) (7.38) (3.21) (8.44) (1.67) (0.52) 
       
Industry F.E. No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Obs 4,647 4,769 4,800 4,647 4,769 4,800 
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Table XII 
Robustness Checks on the Propensity to enter Strategic Alliances/Joint Ventures 
This table reports the probability of entering into strategic alliances or joint ventures.  The sample is composed of SDC/COMPUSTAT merged observations of 
strategic alliances and joint ventures, with matching observations from COMPUSTAT, from 1986 through 2005.  Model A and B employ a multinomial logistic 
model with firms not entering into an alliance as the base case.  Sub-model 1 (A1 and B1) analyze the choice of forming a strategic alliance against the base case 
while sub-model 2 (A2 and B2) analyze the choice of forming a joint venture.  Columns (C) and (D) employ a linear probability model; with the dependent 
variable set to ‘0’ for no alliance, ‘1’ for strategic alliance and ‘2’ for joint venture.  Columns (E) and (F) also employ a linear probability model with the sample 
restricted to firms in the 1-digit SIC code in the 2000 or 3000. Industry fixed effects are at the 2-digit SIC level.  Variables definitions can be referenced in 
Appendix A.  Variables are winsorized at 2%. Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit SIC. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively.   
 
 Structure Structure Structure Structure Structure Structure Structure Structure 
Variable (A1) (A2) (B1) (B2) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
RESTRICT1 2.072*** 3.137***   0.640***  0.495***  
 (7.36) (7.38)   (8.13)  (5.20)  
         
YTC   0.037** 0.205***  0.030***  0.057*** 
   (2.03) (8.27)  (4.64)  (6.82) 
         
Log(Size) 0.051*** 0.180*** 0.061*** 0.188*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.029*** 
 (3.47) (6.37) (4.47) (7.04) (6.80) (8.11) (5.90) (5.77) 
         
R&D 2.418*** -6.332*** 2.423*** -4.727*** 0.056 0.198** 0.416*** 0.698*** 
 (7.80) (8.09) (7.83) (6.13) (0.63) (2.20) (3.46) (5.67) 
         
Q 0.088*** 0.026 0.087*** 0.050** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.020*** 
 (9.37) (1.29) (9.13) (2.50) (5.55) (6.89) (3.48) (4.63) 
         
ROA -0.465*** -2.022*** -0.421*** -1.548*** -0.269*** -0.227*** -0.158*** -0.051 
 (2.80) (5.81) (2.62) (4.61) (5.86) (5.08) (2.64) (0.87) 
         
Intercept -0.794*** -2.640*** -0.739*** -3.223*** 0.828*** 0.897*** 0.304*** 0.197*** 
 (6.69) (11.18) (6.22) (13.64) (3.57) (3.85) (7.11) (4.37) 
         
Industry F.E. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Pseudo    /    0.040 0.037 0.041 0.035 0.021 0.023 
Obs 7,902 8,157 7,902 8,157 5,017 5,138 
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Table XIII 
Determinants of Boundary Selection at the Firm-Pair Level: Degree of Restriction 
This table reports a series of probit models estimating the probability of firm pairs entering into either a 
strategic alliance or joint venture.  The sample is composed of SDC/COMPUSTAT merged observations of 
strategic alliances and joint ventures from 1986 through 2005 along with COMPUSTAT firms as their 
matched counterparts.  Columns (A) through (C) present binary probit models; taking the value of ‘1’ for joint 
ventures and ‘0’ for strategic alliances.  Columns (D) through (F) present ordered probit models; taking the 
values of 2, 1, or 0 for joint venture, strategic alliance and no alliance respectively.  Variables definitions can 
be referenced in Appendix A.  Variables are winsorized at 2%.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 JVSA JVSA JVSA Structure Structure Structure 
Variable (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
AVG(RESTRICT1) 1.745***   1.326***   
 (2.77)   (4.27)   
       
AVG(RESTRICT2)  2.015***   0.632**  
  (4.51)   (2.35)  
       
AVG(YTC)   0.317***   0.116*** 
   (5.97)   (4.81) 
       
VRC -0.050 0.034 -0.020 -0.021 -0.018 -0.007 
 (0.55) (0.45) (0.23) (0.51) (0.45) (0.18) 
       
Log(Hor) 0.018 -0.022 -0.036 -0.066** -0.065** -0.067** 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.55) (2.20) (2.21) (2.28) 
       
Log(Distance) 0.021 0.029 0.014 -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.039*** 
 (0.84) (1.13) (0.57) (2.87) (3.05) (3.54) 
       
Log[REL(Size)] -0.077*** -0.076*** -0.103*** 0.093*** 0.098*** 0.096*** 
 (3.08) (3.05) (4.16) (7.04) (7.76) (7.59) 
       
Log[AVG(Size)] 0.031 0.033 0.038 0.098*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 
 (0.86) (0.95) (1.16) (5.96) (6.47) (6.53) 
       
AVG(R&D) -5.026*** -5.877*** -3.231*** 0.391 0.366 0.816** 
 (6.46) (7.22) (4.16) (1.20) (1.16) (2.49) 
       
AVG(Q) -0.020 -0.031 0.009 0.018** 0.012 0.024*** 
 (1.04) (1.55) (0.46) (2.07) (1.45) (2.74) 
       
AVG(ROA) -1.269*** -0.914** -0.987*** -0.433*** -0.449*** -0.401** 
 (3.42) (2.41) (2.80) (2.64) (2.83) (2.54) 
       
Intercept1 -0.933*** -1.068*** -1.686*** 0.960*** 0.909*** 1.079*** 
 (2.72) (3.13) (4.79) (6.316) (6.18) (6.87) 
       
Intercept2    2.549*** 2.484*** 2.693*** 
    (16.34) (16.44) (16.62) 
       
Pseudo    0.088 0.108 0.111 0.032 0.030 0.032 
       
Obs 1,703 1,773 1,799 3,723 3,889 3,873 
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Table XIV 
Analysis of Boundary Sub-Categories and Strategic Alliance Choice: Firm-Level 
This table reports a series of probit models estimating the probability of firm pairs entering into various 
alliance sub-categories.  The sample is composed of SDC/COMPUSTAT merged observations of strategic 
alliances and joint ventures from 1986 through 2005.  Columns (A) and (C) use an ordered probit model using 
the full sample of identified sub-alliance definitions, joint ventures, and their matched counterparts.  The 
dependent variable Structure2 takes on the values of 4, 3, 2, 1 and 0 for joint venture, 
R&D/Technology/Manufacturing alliance, Marketing Agreement, Licensing Agreement, and no alliance 
respectively.  Columns (B) and (D) limit the sample to only identified strategic alliance (no matched firms) 
with the dependent variable taking the values of 0, 1, and 2 for the alliance types.  Columns (E) and (F) model 
a binary probit model with a limited sample of R&D/Technology/Manufacturing alliances and joint ventures 
with the dependent variable set to 0 and 1 respectively.  Variables definitions can be referenced in Appendix A.  
Variables are winsorized at 2% and standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit SIC industry code.  ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 Structure2 Structure2^ Structure2 Structure2^ Structure2^ Structure2^ 
Variable (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
RESTRICT1 1.507*** 0.901***   0.693*  
 (10.33) (3.05)   (1.84)  
       
YTC   0.118*** 0.051*  0.188*** 
   (9.64) (1.79)  (6.68) 
       
Log(Size) 0.037*** -0.033** 0.046*** -0.009 0.091*** 0.074*** 
 (4.41) (2.19) (5.85) (0.64) (5.59) (4.60) 
       
R&D 0.430** 1.541*** 0.842*** 1.756*** -5.744*** -4.733*** 
 (2.49) (4.80) (4.85) (5.52) (13.53) (11.23) 
       
Q 0.018*** -0.002 0.029*** -0.001 -0.006 0.013 
 (3.48) (0.24) (5.39) (0.14) (0.56) (1.09) 
       
ROA -0.252*** 0.407** -0.177** 0.330** -1.412*** -1.286*** 
 (2.85) (2.55) (2.08) (2.13) (7.38) (6.89) 
       
Intercept     -0.733*** -1.162*** 
     (5.48) (7.86) 
       
Industry F.E. No No No No No No 
Year F.E. No No No No No No 
       
Pseudo    /    0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.122 0.132 
       
Obs 6,785 2,867 6,986 2,943 2,861 2,878 
^Indicates the dependent variable is modified to fit the sample used such that the lowest level of the dependent variable is ‘0’. 
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Table XV 
Analysis of Boundary Sub-Categories and Strategic Alliance Choice: Firm-Pair Level 
This table reports a series of probit and linear probability models estimating the probability of firm pairs 
entering into various alliance sub-categories.  The sample is composed of SDC/COMPUSTAT merged 
observations of strategic alliances and joint ventures from 1986 through 2005.  Columns (A) and (C) use an 
ordered probit model using the full sample of identified sub-alliance definitions, joint ventures, and their 
matched counterparts.  The dependent variable Structure2 takes on the values of 4, 3, 2, 1 and 0 for joint 
venture, R&D/Technology/Manufacturing alliance, Marketing Agreement, Licensing Agreement, and no 
alliance respectively.  Columns (B) and (D) limit the sample to only identified strategic alliance (no matched 
firms) with the dependent variable taking the values of 0, 1, and 2 for the alliance types.  Columns (E) and (F) 
model a binary probit model with a limited sample of R&D/Technology/Manufacturing alliances and joint 
ventures with the dependent variable set to 0 and 1 respectively.  Industry fixed effects are at the 2-digit SIC 
level.  Variables definitions can be referenced in Appendix A.  Variables are winsorized at 2% and standard 
errors are clustered at the 2-digit SIC industry code.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. 
 
 Structure2 Structure2^ Structure2 Structure2^ Structure2^ Structure2^ 
Variable (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
AVG(RESTRICT1) 1.952*** 1.486**   1.262**  
 (5.97) (2.14)   (2.40)  
       
AVG(YTC)   0.175*** 0.129**  0.299*** 
   (6.73) (1.98)  (4.47) 
       
VRC -0.021 0.123 0.001 0.088 0.011 -0.058 
 (0.49) (1.37) (0.02) (1.03) (0.10) (0.57) 
       
Log(Hor) -0.085*** -0.042 -0.090*** -0.037 0.028 0.010 
 (2.65) (0.65) (2.85) (0.60) (0.36) (0.13) 
       
Log(Distance) -0.025** 0.015 -0.033*** 0.004 0.020 0.001 
 (2.12) (0.68) (2.79) (0.18) (0.67) (0.04) 
       
Log[REL(Size)] 0.105*** -0.010 0.107 -0.012 -0.106*** -0.130*** 
 (7.45) (0.39) (7.86) (0.50) (3.69) (4.61) 
       
Log[AVG(Size)] 0.074*** -0.073** 0.081*** -0.008 0.074* 0.061* 
 (4.17) (1.97) (5.07) (0.24) (1.92) (1.66) 
       
AVG(R&D) 1.182*** 2.794*** 1.792*** 2.711*** -7.855*** -5.490*** 
 (3.40) (3.93) (5.08) (3.93) (8.46) (6.06) 
       
AVG(Q) -0.004 0.000 0.008 -0.008 0.012 0.046* 
 (0.36) (0.02) (0.75) (0.39) (0.47) (1.80) 
       
AVG(ROA) -0.004 0.768** -0.003 0.500 -1.766*** -1.741*** 
 (0.02) (2.06) (0.02) (1.49) (4.19) (4.29) 
       
Intercept     -0.700* -1.180*** 
     (1.85) (3.03) 
       
Pseudo    /    0.029 0.022 0.030 0.017 0.147 0.149 
       
Obs 3,323 1,115 3,442 1,175 1,080 1,095 
^Indicates the dependent variable is modified to fit the sample used such that the lowest level of the dependent variable is ‘0’. 
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Table XVI 
Pre/Post Announcement Date Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics and differences of the firm-pair level variables two years prior to two 
years after the boundary change.  The sample is composed of COMPUSTAT/SDC merged samples of strategic 
alliances and joint ventures from 1986 through 2000 and includes matched observations taken from the 
Primary Pool and Secondary Pool of firm-pairs.  Panels A and B report univariate firm-pair descriptions of the 
matched COMPUSTAT and SDC matched observations.  Panels C and D report univariate firm-pair 
descriptions of strategic alliances and joint ventures respectively.  Variables are constructed using winsorized 
firm characteristics at 2%.  Variables definitions can be referenced in Appendix A.   
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of COMPUSTAT Matched Firm-Pairs +/- 2 years from Announcement Date 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
∆%Cross Patents 2,047 0.066 0.000 0.366 -1.472 10.000 
∆Size 3,585 2,330.58 952.77 3,502.17 -8,931.59 23,730.76 
∆R&D 3,585 -0.000 0.000 0.066 -0.820 0.766 
∆Q 2,831 0.658 0.212 3.147 -30.798 28.934 
∆ROA 3,498 0.008 0.002 0.173 -1.364 4.367 
Distance 2,868 1,908.38 1,597.44 1,439.49 0.000 7,902.07 
Hor 3,585 1.362 1.000 1.583 0.000 4.000 
VRC 3,585 0.350 0.000 0.477 0.000 1.000 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of SDC Matched Firm-Pairs +/- 2 years from Announcement Date 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
∆%Cross Patents 2,354 0.101 0.000 0.946 -1.941 24.983 
∆Size 3,741 2,105.63 867.95 3,334.87 -5,801.00 22,687.26 
∆R&D 3,741 0.001 0.000 0.070 -1.116 1.001 
∆Q 3,154 0.770 0.278 3.191 -27.500 35.741 
∆ROA 3,670 0.015 0.005 0.150 -0.995 1.397 
Distance 3,341 1,993.86 1,750.31 1,474.57 0.000 6,084.12 
Hor 3,741 1.356 1.000 1.588 0.000 4.000 
VRC 3,741 0.366 0.000 0.482 0.000 1.000 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of Strategic Alliance Firm-Pairs +/- 2 years from Announcement Date 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
∆%Cross Patents 1,337 0.122 0.000 0.460 -1.942 10.583 
∆Size 1,688 2,454.05 1,107.04 3,571.05 -9,055.00 21,408.74 
∆R&D 1,688 0.002 0.001 0.076 -1.627 0.584 
∆Q 1,449 1.122 0.468 3.758 -26.964 36.857 
∆ROA 1,661 0.022 0.015 0.182 -1.038 2.239 
Distance 1,566 1,876.55 1,557.06 1,525.08 0.000 4,335.52 
Hor 1,688 1.376 1.000 1.609 0.000 4.000 
VRC 1,688 0.352 0.000 0.477 0.000 1.000 
 
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics of Joint Ventures +/- 2 years from Announcement Date 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
∆%Cross Patents 231 0.185 0.000 0.905 -1.801 10.583 
∆Size 415 1,863.72 736.77 3,291.72 -7,034.10 21,536.72 
∆R&D 415 0.003 0.000 0.048 -0.469 0.383 
∆Q 364 1.205 0.243 4.070 -7.767 26.846 
∆ROA 408 0.034 0.008 0.169 -0.867 1.004 
Distance 348 1,588.68 1,209.19 1,317.30 0.000 6,267.10 
Hor 415 1.279 1.000 1.479 0.000 4.000 
VRC 415 0.335 0.000 0.473 0.000 1.000 
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Table XVII 
Analysis of Change in Knowledge Flow Pre/Post Alliance Announcement 
This table reports the effect of boundary choice on the change in knowledge flow between firms.  The sample 
is composed of COMPUSTAT/SDC merged samples of strategic alliances and joint ventures from 1986 
through 2000.  Columns (A) through (C) use matched firms from the Primary Pool of firms from 
COMPUSTAT.  Columns (D) through (E) use matched firms from the Secondary Pool of firms from SDC’s 
Strategic Alliance and Joint Venture database. Year fixed effects are included. Variables definitions can be 
referenced in Appendix A.  Variables are constructed using winsorized firm characteristics at 2%. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels respectively.   
 
 
  
 ∆Cross Patents ∆Cross Patents ∆Cross Patents ∆Cross Patents ∆Cross Patents 
Variable (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Boundary 0.064***   0.065***  
 (3.24)   (3.81)  
      
Structure  0.065***   0.065*** 
  (4.01)   (4.62) 
      
JVSA   0.115**   
   (2.29)   
      
VRC 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.112*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 
 (3.68) (3.72) (3.16) (4.11) (4.16) 
      
Log(Hor) 0.037** 0.037** 0.057** 0.030** 0.030** 
 (2.42) (2.43) (2.27) (2.32) (2.32) 
      
Log(Distance) 0.010* 0.010* 0.024*** 0.011** 0.011** 
 (1.76) (1.73) (2.61) (2.33) (2.32) 
      
      0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.63) (0.69) (0.33) (0.98) (1.00) 
      
     0.020 0.020 -0.056 0.047 0.048 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.19) (0.33) (0.33) 
      
   0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 
 (0.16) (0.11) (0.37) (0.16) (0.14) 
      
     0.119* 0.120* 0.201 0.100 0.101 
 (1.65) (1.67) (1.64) (1.56) (1.58) 
      
Intercept -0.047 -0.050 -0.110 -0.052 -0.055 
 (1.06) (1.15) (1.56) (1.37) (1.47) 
      
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
   0.015 0.017 0.021 0.014 0.016 
      
Obs 2,659 2,659 1,247 3,066 3,066 
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Table XVIII 
Target and Acquirer Descriptive Statistics for Mergers/Acquisitions 
This table reports descriptive statistics of Target and Acquirer firms with completed mergers between 1986 and 
2005 as well as firms matched to Target firms from COMPUSTAT.  The sample is composed of completed 
deals from SDC’s Mergers & Acquisitions database.  Panel A reports descriptive statistics of firms matched to 
Target firms taken from COMPUSTAT.  Panel B and C report descriptive statistics of Target and Acquirer 
firms respectively.  Variables are winsorized at 2%.  Variable definitions can be referenced in Appendix A.  
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of COMPUSTAT firms matched to Target firms from 1986 through 2005 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
RESTRICT1 465 0.063 0.020 0.107 0.000 1.000 
RESTRICT2 499 0.073 0.018 0.134 0.000 1.000 
YTC 518 1.852 1.600 1.519 0.000 12.000 
Size 1,332 525.716 99.210 1,589.53 0.658 15,779.00 
R&D 1,332 0.071 0.004 0.118 0.000 0.566 
Q 1,182 2.358 1.488 2.567 0.600 16.933 
ROA 1,315 0.017 0.094 0.236 -2.028 0.355 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Target firms from 1986 through 2005 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
RESTRICT1 507 0.062 0.026 0.092 0.000 0.667 
RESTRICT2 556 0.070 0.019 0.119 0.000 1.000 
YTC 585 2.224 2.000 1.615 0.000 13.000 
Size 1,349 565.044 102.940 1,649.91 0.686 15,779.00 
R&D 1,349 0.078 0.010 0.127 0.000 0.566 
Q 1,290 2.224 2.317 2.317 0.600 16.933 
ROA 1,328 0.017 0.101 0.298 -2.028 0.355 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of Acquirer firms from 1986 through 2005 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
RESTRICT1 760 0.078 0.043 0.091 0.000 0.429 
RESTRICT2 792 0.081 0.052 0.096 0.000 1.000 
YTC 816 2.260 2.243 1.337 0.000 9.333 
Size 1,349 3,442.50 915.38 5,036.71 2.167 15,779.00 
R&D 1,349 0.051 0.014 0.084 0.000 0.566 
Q 1,288 2.645 1.853 2.505 0.600 16.933 
ROA 1,338 0.116 0.141 0.174 -2.028 0.355 
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Table XIX 
Relative Firm-Pair Measures of Strategic Alliances, Joint Ventures, and Mergers/Acquisitions 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the relative values between firms in a firm pair across boundary types.  
The sample is composed of strategic alliances, joint ventures and mergers/acquisitions from 1986 through 
2005.  Strategic alliances and joint ventures are obtained through SDC’s Strategic Alliance and Joint Venture 
database while mergers/acquisitions are obtained from SDC’s Mergers/Acquisitions database.  Panel A reports 
firm-pair specific statistics for strategic alliances.  Panel B reports statistics for joint ventures and Panel C 
reports statistics for mergers/acquisitions.  The variables RESTRICT1, Size, and Q are calculated as relative 
measures.  The maximum value of the firm-pair is divided by the minimum value.  Variables R&D and ROA 
are also relative measures, but calculated using the difference between the maximum and minimum value.  The 
variables VRC and HOR are already defined at the firm-pair level.  Relative measures are winsorized at the 2% 
level.  Variable definitions can be referenced in Appendix A. 
 
 
Panel A: Relative Values between Firms in Strategic Alliances 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
RESTRICT1 1,134 4.119 2.657 3.435 1.000 12.390 
Size 2,563 39.506 5.655 80.622 1.000 293.465 
R&D 2,563 0.086 0.056 0.098 0.000 0.566 
Q 2,477 2.208 1.690 1.272 1.000 5.295 
ROA 2,534 0.180 0.111 0.235 0.000 2.384 
VRC 2,563 0.372 0.000 0.483 0.000 1.000 
HOR 2,563 1.465 1.000 1.633 0.000 4.000 
 
Panel B: Relative Values between Firms in Joint Ventures 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
RESTRICT1 173 3.317 2.132 2.943 1.000 12.390 
Size 556 33.448 3.962 71.099 1.000 293.465 
R&D 556 0.038 0.014 0.064 0.000 0.541 
Q 531 1.734 1.313 1.029 1.002 5.295 
ROA 547 0.118 0.064 0.192 0.000 2.215 
VRC 556 0.356 0.000 0.479 0.000 1.000 
HOR 556 1.390 1.000 1.550 0.000 4.000 
 
Panel C: Relative Values between Firms in Mergers/Acquisitions 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
RESTRICT1 230 4.242 2.938 3.477 1.000 12.458 
Size 1,349 29.890 6.283 62.053 1.000 293.504 
R&D 1,349 0.054 0.013 0.097 0.000 0.566 
Q 1,235 1.766 1.443 0.917 1.000 5.295 
ROA 1,317 0.170 0.086 0.256 0.000 2.195 
VRC 1,349 0.410 0.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 
HOR 1,349 2.314 3.000 1.601 0.000 4.000 
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Table XX 
Analysis of Likelihood of Becoming Target Firm 
This table reports a series of linear probability models estimating the likelihood of a firm being a target firm in 
a merger/acquisition.  The sample is composed of firms from SDC Mergers & Acquisitions database from 
1986 through 2005.  Columns (A) through (C) also contain firms matched to the target firm from 
COMPUSTAT.  For Columns (A) through (C), the dependent variable takes the value of ‘1’ if the firm is a 
target firm and ‘0’ if the firm is a matched firm.  For Columns (D) through (F), the dependent variable takes 
the value of ‘1’ for a target firm and ‘0’ for an acquirer firm.  Industry fixed-effects are at the 2-digit SIC level.  
Variable definitions can be referenced in Appendix A.  Variables are winsorized at 2% and standard errors are 
clustered at the 2-digit SIC industry code.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 
 Target Target Target Target Target Target 
Variable (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
RESTRICT1 0.015   0.336**   
 (0.10)   (2.27)   
       
RESTRICT2  0.142   0.214*  
  (0.91)   (1.86)  
       
YTC   0.048***   0.016* 
   (4.03)   (1.75) 
       
Log(Size) 0.013 0.007 0.008 -0.142*** -0.141*** -0.140*** 
 (1.01) (0.61) (0.68) (18.84) (20.23) (21.09) 
       
R&D 0.572*** 0.426** 0.477** -0.181 -0.258 -0.145 
 (2.90) (2.18) (2.55) (1.11) (1.63) (0.96) 
       
Q -0.016*** -0.012* -0.012** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 (2.65) (1.96) (2.00) (4.72) (4.50) (4.50) 
       
ROA 0.060 0.063 0.037 -0.036 -0.051 -0.025 
 (0.78) (0.84) (0.51) (0.53) (0.79) (0.40) 
       
Intercept -0.171 -0.073 -0.215 1.111*** 0.739* 0.741* 
 (0.33) (0.14) (0.42) (2.64) (1.78) (1.79) 
       
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
   0.053 0.039 0.052 0.310 0.319 0.328 
       
Obs 922 1,004 1,047 1,220 1,300 1,351 
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Table XXI 
Descriptive Statistics of Announcement Date Effects for Strategic Alliances, Joint Ventures and 
Mergers/Acquisitions 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the 1, 2, and 5 day abnormal returns around the announcement dates 
of strategic alliance, joint ventures and mergers/acquisitions.  The sample is composed of deals found in SDC’s 
Strategic Alliance and Joint Venture database as well as SDC’s Mergers & Acquisitions database from 1986 
through 2005.  Announcement dates come from SDC and are verified by Lexis-Nexis and online corporate 
announcements.  Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the actual return and the market 
return using the CRSP value-weighted index over the time window.  Panel A and B report the abnormal return 
of each firm for strategic alliances and joint ventures respectively.  Panel C reports the abnormal return of the 
acquirer firm of a merger/acquisition.  Returns are winsorized at 2%.   
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of firm level abnormal returns for strategic alliances 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
1 Day Return 4,766 0.007 0.001 0.060 -0.148 0.242 
2 Day Return 4,766 0.007 0.001 0.084 -0.554 0.323 
5 Day Return 4,766 0.011 0.002 0.117 -0.326 0.446 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of firm level abnormal returns for joint ventures 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
1 Day Return 998 0.004 0.001 0.047 -0.148 0.242 
2 Day Return 998 0.004 0.001 0.071 -0.554 0.323 
5 Day Return 998 0.002 -0.001 0.089 -0.326 0.446 
 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of deal cumulative abnormal returns for mergers/acquisitions 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
1 Day Return 758 -0.012 -0.007 0.072 -0.272 0.189 
2 Day Return 758 -0.010 -0.006 0.082 -0.264 0.260 
5 Day Return 758 -0.009 -0.007 0.109 -0.409 0.302 
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Table XXII 
Announcement Date Effects of Strategic Alliances, Joint Ventures, and Mergers/Acquisitions 
This table reports the effect of knowledge flow restrictions on the 1, 2, and 5 day abnormal returns around the 
announcement dates of strategic alliances, joint ventures and mergers/acquisitions.  The sample is composed of 
deals found in SDC’s Strategic Alliance and Joint Venture database as well as SDC’s Mergers & Acquisitions 
database from 1986 through 2005.  Announcement dates come from SDC and are verified by Lexis-Nexis and 
online corporate announcements.  Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the actual return 
and the market return using the CRSP value-weighted index over the t-1/t+1, t-2/t+2, and t-5/t+5 day windows 
where t=0 is the announcement date.  Diff is the difference between the predicted choice of a strategic alliance 
versus a joint venture and the actual choice from the probit model found in Table XI, Column (A).  Standard 
errors are clustered at the 2-digit SIC industry code and variables are winsorized at 2%.  Variable definitions 
can be referenced in Appendix A.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively.   
 
 MRet1 MRet2 MRet5 MRet1 MRet2 MRet5 
Variable (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
JVSA 0.005 0.005 0.001    
 (0.76) (0.55) (0.20)    
       
RESTRICT1 0.033*** 0.053*** 0.084*** 0.014 0.014 0.017 
 (3.26) (3.83) (4.30) (0.38) (0.33) (0.29) 
       
JVSA x 
RESTRICT1 
0.011 0.022 0.011    
 (0.37) (0.56) (0.20)    
       
Log(Size) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004 -0.006* -0.002 
 (7.44) (5.30) (4.47) (1.27) (1.89) (0.52) 
       
R&D -0.014 -0.037** -0.022 -0.098 0.069 0.175 
 (1.11) (2.12) (0.87) (1.37) (0.86) (1.58) 
       
Q 0.001** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (2.41) (3.03) (5.36) (1.20) (0.46) (0.29) 
       
ROA -0.002 -0.005 -0.012 -0.021 0.037 -0.042 
 (0.33) (0.57) (1.00) (0.70) (1.09) (0.91) 
       
Diff -0.010 -0.000 -0.003    
 (1.10) (0.01) (0.17)    
       
Intercept 0.003 0.003 0.028 0.064 0.099 0.063 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.26) (0.85) (1.18) (0.54) 
       
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
   0.046 0.029 0.040 0.159 0.157 0.105 
       
Obs 3,756 3,756 3,756 304 304 304 
       
       
       
       
 
